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VOTING AS VETO
Michael S. Kang *
This Article introduces an alternate conception of voting as veto-
based on "negative preferences" against a voter's least preferred
outcomes-that enriches voting theory and practice otherwise dom-
inated by a conception of voting as a means of expressing a voter's
ideal preferences. Indeed, the familiar binary choices presented in
American political elections obscure the pervasiveness of negative
preferences, which are descriptively salient in voting under all types
of circumstances. Negative preferences have been overlooked, despite
their theoretical and practical importance across many domains,
leaving important questions unexplored in the literature. The Article
develops a normative and positive account of voting as veto that
identifies the costs, benefits, and critical tradeoffs in the formal rec-
ognition of negative preferences.
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INTRODUCTION
The reality television show American Idol chooses a winning contestant
by measuring what I call the "affirmative preferences" of the show's audi-
ence. American Idol gradually winnows down a large field of singers
through a weekly process of elimination. After each week's performances,
American Idol invites viewers to vote for their favorite singer by recording
their top choice through a telephone vote. The votes are "affirmative" in the
sense that each voter registers her most preferred choice-the competitor
whom the voter most desires to be the ultimate winner. The competitor with
the fewest votes during the week is eliminated from the show, and the proc-
ess iterates in subsequent weeks until only one competitor, the winner,
remains.
Affirmative preferences count in American Idol-what I call "negative
preferences" do not. "Negative preferences," as I treat them here, reflect the
voters' desires to avoid certain alternatives among a field eligible for selec-
tion. Rather than reflecting affirmative preference for a particular
alternative, negative preferences represent an opposition against a particular
alternative.' Because American Idol counts only affirmative preferences in
the voting process, a contestant's objective on the show each week is to
avoid being the contestant in the multi-competitor field with the fewest af-
firmative votes.2 Voters' negative preferences go unrecognized as a formal
matter in the voting process. If American Idol were to change its voting
process and formally recognize negative preferences, the show would ask
1. I use the term "preference" to describe the relative attractiveness of different alternatives
presented for selection and elimination. Affirmative and negative preferences differ in that affirma-
tive preference describes the superior attractiveness of one's most-preferred alternative(s) over other
alternatives, whereas negative preference describes the inferior attractiveness of one's least-preferred
alternative(s). Although research from psychology suggests that the cognitive and neural processes
underlying affirmative and negative preferences may differ in some ways, I am agnostic for pur-
poses of this Article about whether affirmative and negative preferences are fundamentally different
in kind from a deeper philosophical or neurological standpoint. My claim is simply that voters'
negative preferences can be salient, can influence voting decisions, and deserve recognition.
2. See Gary W. Cox, Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions, 31 Am. J.
POL. So. 82, 92 (1987) (noting that under such circumstances, "candidates care only about not
placing last in a given voter's ranking").
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voters to decide which competitor is least deserving of winning the show.
The competitor who receives the most votes-that is, the most votes as the
worst competitor and least deserving of victory---could be eliminated each
week until only one winning competitor survived.
The conceptual distinction between affirmative and negative prefer-
ences, as I describe them, tracks a substantive difference in the subjective
motivation underlying the voter's decision. For instance, one might vote for
a candidate based mainly on a strong affinity for that particular candidate-
an affirmative preference for the candidate--or vote for the same candidate
based mainly on a strong dislike for the candidate's competition-a negative
preference against the opposition .3 "Affirmative" or "negative" describes the
direction of the underlying preference motivating the vote choice. Although
subjective motivation may be multifaceted, a voter might have voted for
Barack Obama in last year's presidential election mainly because he liked
Obama, or alternatively, mainly because he disliked Obama's opponent,
John McCain, as well as other minor competitors such as Bob Barr and
Ralph Nader.4
The familiar predominance in American elections of binary choices be-
tween only two meaningful alternatives obscures what might otherwise be a
more intuitive distinction between voting based on affirmative rather than
negative preferences! The traditional method of plurality voting in the
United States-for instance, the familiar first-past-the-post, winner-take-all
format for candidate elections--encourages an effective voter choice be-
tween only candidates from the two major parties as a function of
Duverger's law.6 When only two alternatives are offered to voters, it makes
3. See infra Section fl.A (discussing anticandidate voting).
4. Assume that Voter 1 would assign the following cardinal utility scores to the following
candidates.
2004 2008
John Kerry ] 0 Barack Obama 10
George Bush -10 John McCain 0
Voter I can be said to vote for John Kerry over George Bush mainly because he has a negative
disliking for Bush, who is Voter l's least-preferred candidate among the four listed above. By con-
trast, Voter I can be said to vote for Barack Obama over John McCain mainly because he has an
affirmative liking for Obama, his most-preferred candidate among the four listed above. The differ-
ence between the voters is not intensity of preference, but more important for my purposes, what
can be understood as the psychological valence of preferences as Voter I might see it. Of course,
this hypothetical represents only what may be a clear case, designed to illustrate the general princi-
ple, while many voters in practice will arrive at decisions that cannot be characterized clearly as
dominated by an affirmative or a negative preference.
5. See, e.g., Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive
Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REv. 917 (1990) (describing how the two-party sys-
tem simplifies voter choices).
6. See Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not
Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 Sup.
CT. REv. 331, 367-71 (applying Duverger's law to the two-party system in the United States). See
generally William Riker, The Two-party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of
Political Science, 76 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 753 (1982) (explaining the tendency under Duverger's law
toward a two-party system with first-past-the-post, winner-take-all elections).
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no difference whether voters are asked to formally vote their affirmative or
negative preferences, because a vote for the Democrat is effectively a vote
against the Republican, and vice versa. The mismatch between negative
preferences and traditional voting (which formally recognizes mainly af-
firmative preferences) can obscure even the most salient cases of negative
preferences at work.
Negative preferences are therefore underappreciated but nevertheless
practically important across many domains of voting. Indeed, negative pref-
erences regularly motivate all types of voting decisions, and at times
represent voters' most meaningful preferences. What is more, a wide array
of voting procedures, which this Article briefly surveys, permits the expres-
sion of negative preferences to varying degrees, but the literature has not
explored this commonality across procedures. As a result, although the no-
tion of negative preferences should be intuitively familiar, there is
nonetheless a need in the voting literature for systematic consideration of
negative preferences in voting as a potential tool in democratic governance.
One goal of this Article is to give a name to negative preferences and
highlight their importance in voting and democratic governance. In the ab-
sence of a linguistic label for negative preferences against an alternative or
outcome, and without a means for exercising those preferences, it is easy to
conceptualize preferences as only affirmative preferences for something.7
Academic theory about voting and governance usually regards recognition
of affirmative preferences as the operative assumption, because when asked
to cast a vote, whether it is voting for the American Idol or American presi-
dent, it is traditionally thought to be a vote in support of one's most
preferred alternative or candidate above the other eligible ones.8 This Article
begins the project of sharpening the distinctions between familiar under-
standings about voting as affirmative choice on one hand, and voting as
expression of negative preference as a practical matter on the other hand.
In addition to subverting the traditional conception of voting-from af-
firmative to negative-I hope to complicate the traditional conception of
veto, which is typically exercised as an outright negative trump held by a
single actor. The president, for instance, may exercise a unilateral right of
veto to override the affirmative choice of the Congress. By contrast, voting
based on negative preferences may successfully aggregate the many nega-
tive preferences from a multimember electorate to constitute a collective
7. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 269 (1987) (arguing that "as
soon as we name, we invariably reify"); DALE SPENDER, MAN MADE LANGUAGE 163 (2d ed. 1985)
("[W]ithout a name it is difficult to accept the existence of an object, an event, a feeling."); Barbara
Du Bois, Passionate scholarship: notes on values, knowing and method in feminist social science in
THEORIES OF WOMEN'S STUDIES 105, 108 (Gloria Bowles & Renate Duelli Klein eds., 1983) ("That
which has no name, that for which we have no words or concepts, is rendered mute and invisi-
ble .... ); Frederic G. Cassidy, A Note of Names and Censors, 41 NAMES: A JOURNAL OF
ONOMAsTICs 262, 263 (1993) (arguing that "[niothing exists concretely in human thought .. until it
exists as a word").
8. See, e.g., Ronald Rogowski, Representation in Political Theory and in Law, 91 ETHICS
395, 399 (1981) (concluding that "if representation is perfect... the representative person or institu-
tion reflects in every instance the members' ideal preferences").
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veto, exercised by the voting body, rather than the more familiar unilateral
veto held by an individual executive. Reconceptualizing voting as veto
therefore flips both voting and veto on their heads. It simultaneously upsets
familiar conceptions of collective voting, from affirmative to negative, and
of the veto, from the individual to the collective, to yield a new framework
of "voting as veto"-the recognition of negative preferences in voting to
pare away disfavored alternatives in the process of determining collective
choice.
This Article builds a positive and normative account for voting as veto
and the formal recognition of negative preferences in voting. Different vot-
ing structures formally recognize negative preferences in voting to varying
degrees and thus provide more or less opportunity for the effectuation of
negative preferences in collective decision making. Looking across a variety
of different voting procedures, this Article identifies commonality in how
they effectuate negative preferences and sees them not as troubling diver-
gences from majority rule based on affirmative preferences, but instead as
connecting with a different orientation about what types of preferences
count in democratic practices. Even when satisfaction of negative prefer-
ences does not align with usual sensibilities about voting, a focus on
negative preferences may offer a fuller understanding of voters' subjective
motivations in voting and enable one to better understand the preferences
that motivate voters within a specific context.
However, this Article does not claim that negative preferences are al-
ways more important, more salient, or more common than affirmative
preferences. Nor does it claim that negative preferences always, or even in
most cases, deserve priority over affirmative preferences. Greater recogni-
tion of negative preferences would certainly bring its own costs, which can
be considerable and prohibitive. Even when voters' primary preferences are
negative, recognition of such preferences could alter voting discourse, en-
courage conflict, and retard change in problematic ways. What is more, the
choice to recognize negative preferences in greater or lesser measure impli-
cates certain value judgments, such as the value of centrism and social
agreement, that cannot be predetermined across the wide variety of voting
contexts discussed in this Article. As such, this Article simply seeks to iden-
tify the important considerations in determining whether greater recognition
of negative preferences would be useful in a given voting context, what in-
formation is needed in making that determination, and which way particular
considerations cut in the analysis. This Article attempts to identify the nec-
essary tradeoffs and assesses the normative case for voting based on
negative preferences contingent upon given value judgments. More descrip-
tively, this Article thus may provide analytic tools to identify why voting
based on negative preferences is deployed where it is, and not deployed
where it is not, and helps explain why it is not more common.
A clearer conception of voting as veto offers a new lens for seeing famil-
iar problems. I offer examples from three different contexts for voting: the
voir dire process for jury selection, racially polarized voting for political
office, and direct democracy. I argue that negative preferences offer a new
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lens for viewing familiar practices and debates in each context. For voir
dire, negative preferences help explain why the process might be structured
as negative selection and suggest what benefits a process of negative selec-
tion offers. For racially polarized voting, negative preferences clarify the
dynamics of racial polarization and help challenge the conventional under-
standing of why cumulative voting advantages the voting interests of the
racial minority. For direct democracy, negative preferences provide an alter-
nate normative perspective on the debate about how well direct democracy
fulfills voters' wishes. In each context, expanding the usual conception of
voter preferences to include explicitly negative preferences adds nuance to
existing scholarly understandings.
A couple caveats are in order. First, this Article is not focused primarily
on the relative strengths of different voting procedures. Within political sci-
ence and other fields, empirical and formal scholarship already provide
descriptive accounts of different types of voting structures. Although the
Article draws from this research, it is only partially, and not principally,
about different types of voting systems and how they operate. This Article is
not focused on how well executive vetoes, supermajority requirements, or
other voting institutions compare against one another, but instead explores
the potential usefulness of effectuating negative preferences across these
different types of institutions. Absent a clear conception of negative prefer-
ences as a focus, the existing literature on voting and different types of
voting structures has not studied the commonality across different voting
structures in terms of how well they recognize negative preferences. Nor has
this existing literature sought to identify the overarching tradeoffs that ac-
company greater recognition of negative preferences beyond a specific
institutional context. This Article begins to fill these gaps with the project of
developing a positive and normative account about the value of recognizing
negative preferences across voting procedures.
Second, this Article explores the role of negative preferences only in the
context of voting. The notion of negative preferences may be similarly use-
ful and intuitive outside the study of voting, but that is beyond the scope of
this Article.9 As a practical matter, it is common for people to have strong
negative preferences that might need expression, through law or otherwise,
across multiple domains. Even in a field where legal instruments usually
specify affirmative preferences with precision, it may be useful to effectuate
what can be an entirely oppositional negative preference.'0 This Article be-
gins by considering the nature of underlying preferences held by voters and
9. In this Article, however, "voting" refers to a great variety of mechanisms for determining
collective choice among two or more decision makers. This definition includes certain examples,
such as voir dire (discussed in Section M.A.), that are not usually considered voting in the collo-
quial sense.
10. Negative preferences help explain the "negative will" from the law of trusts and estates
through which a decedent may specify nothing other than the exclusion of a particular person from
intestate distribution. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302(b)(1) (amended 2006) (codifying the
"negative will," under which a decedent can expressly specify the exclusion of a particular person
from intestate distribution). Thanks to my colleague Jeff Pennell for this example.
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stipulates that there are many circumstances when voters' affirmative prefer-
ences are incomplete, inarticulate, or altogether absent. This Article
considers the utility of voting based on negative preferences that more
closely maps what voters actually prefer under some circumstances.
In this Article, I discuss several overlapping manifestations of voting as
veto. Reference to affirmative or negative preferences denotes citation of
them as subjective motivation for the voter underlying whatever the specific
vote choice made. I discuss "voting based on negative preferences" or "ef-
fectuating negative preferences" to describe voting that is subjectively
motivated by negative preferences, as voters approach voting as a practical
exercise in negative veto, irrespective of the specific voting procedures. By
contrast, I discuss "formal recognition of negative preferences" in voting to
describe voting procedures that formally permit the voter to express negative
preferences more directly. "Voting based on negative preferences" may oc-
cur under virtually any voting procedure to varying degrees, but it may
occur more directly with "formal recognition of negative preferences."
"Formal recognition of negative preferences" should be distinguished from
"traditional voting," which describes the familiar formal recognition of af-
firmative preferences in voting.
In Part I, I introduce the notion of negative preferences, and drawing
heavily from the study of psychology and political science, I argue for their
meaningfulness and salience. I then describe how negative preferences,
though usually not recognized directly in voting as a formal matter, can be
effectuated through different voting procedures in varying degrees. In Part
II, I develop the idea of voting as veto and begin sketching out a positive
and normative account of negative preferences in voting. I explore three sets
of interests implicated by greater formal recognition of negative prefer-
ences-internal, expressive, and instrumental-and explore the tradeoffs
that they present. Finally, in Part III, I examine the implications of affording
new attention to negative preferences in three different contexts of collective
choice-the jury selection process, racially polarized voting, and direct de-
mocracy.
I. NEGATIVE PREFERENCES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
A. Introduction to Negative Preferences
Affirmative preferences are preferences for something. A voter has an
affirmative preference for a particular candidate to be elected, or for a par-
ticular ballot measure to be enacted. For instance, traditional voting entails
the familiar practice of voting for one's most preferred alternative-one's
first choice. In the American practice of "first past the post" plurality voting,
each voter chooses the candidate that she wants in office, with the candidate
who wins a plurality of votes elected to office. Traditional voting thus
1227May 2010]
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permits voters to translate their affirmative preferences for something into
direction for positive action."
Negative preferences are preferences against something. Negative pref-
erences are preferences to be without some specified occurrence or
condition. A voter has a negative preference that a particular candidate not
be elected, or that a particular course of action be rejected. Negative prefer-
ences track a distinctly oppositional desire to avoid a particular alternative,
rather than a desire for any other alternative. The most familiar form of ef-
fectuating negative preferences is the unilateral right of veto exercised by
the president. The unilateral veto instantiates negative preferences because it
does not permit the president affirmatively to design legislation as he likes,
but instead permits him only to block what he does not like. The notion of
negative preferences as a basis for voting as a more a general matter, how-
ever, has been surprisingly neglected in voting theory and law.'
2
The distinction between affirmative and negative preferences here is not
simply a framing effect. As is well-known from prospect theory, the same
choice framed in different but substantively equivalent frames may elicit
different, conflicting responses. 3 People irrationally make different choices
depending on whether the decision is framed in terms of gains or losses.'
4
11. William Riker describes this view of democratic voting as the "populist interpretation" in
which voting "embod[ies] the will of the people." WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPU-
LISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL
CHOICE 11 (1982); see also JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS 4 (1980) ("[Mlajority rule has been considered the keystone of a democratic political sys-
tem in both theory and practice."); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Baron F H. Alexander Von
Humboldt (June 13, 1817), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 88, 89 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., New York & London, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1899) ("[T]o consider the will of the society
enounced by the majority of a single vote, as sacred as if unanimous, is the first of all lessons of
importance .... "); Brett W. King, Wild Political Dreaming: Historical Context, Popular Sover-
eignty, and Supermajority Rules, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 609, 609 (2000) ("In America-a democracy
founded on a belief in popular sovereignty-most people agree that, at least at some level, the fun-
damental principle of majority rule should prevail, and that political decisions may be made by the
majority simply because it is the majority.") (citation omitted).
12. Negative preferences are preferences against something, much as the notion of negative
liberty could be understood as the right to be free from interference. Although negative preferences
are not familiar, negative liberty is firmly ingrained in American law. For instance, Gordon Wood
explains that early Americans conceived of democratic self-government mainly in furtherance of
negative liberty to be free of government intrusion. See, e.g., Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of
American Democracy, or How the People Became Judges in Their Own Causes, 47 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 309, 310 (1999); Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Vested Rights in the Early Republic, 85 VA.
L. REV. 1421, 1426 (1999). Richard Posner argues that the "Constitution is a charter of negative
rather than positive liberties." Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983). See
generally Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001); Garrett Epps,
The Bill of Rights, 82 OR. L. REV. 517 (2003).
13. See John M. Atthowe, Types of Conflict and Their Resolution: A Reinterpretation, 59 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1 (1960); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choice, Values, and
Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:
An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
14. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981) (explaining framing effects); see also Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Gains, Losses and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996) (discuss-
ing framing effects in litigation); Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82
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But as I describe them, affirmative and negative preferences differ because
they describe from opposite ends what can be a perfectly consistent, rational
ranking of alternatives, to the degree that voters possess a full ranking of
alternatives in any given setting. Knowledge of a voter's top choice, among
a field of several alternatives, does not necessarily signal much information
about the voter's least preferred choice. Under traditional voting, the voter
supplies her most favored choice among available alternatives but says noth-
ing at all about any of the other alternatives, except that they are not the
most favored choice. Similarly, under formal recognition of negative prefer-
ences, the voter need not indicate anything about affirmative preferences,
except that the selected outcome is not the most favored choice. In other
words, the distinction between affirmative and negative preferences reflects
not confusion on the voter's part, but different slices of information from a
voter's full ordinal ranking of the eligible alternatives.
Negative preferences are substantively meaningful in their own right. Al-
though democratic voting today tends to focus mainly on affirmative
preferences, voters also possess real preferences about their least favored
alternative, and those negative preferences can be salient and even more in-
tensely held than affirmative preferences. It may be surprisingly common
for people to have mainly negative preferences about important questions,
without having strong affirmative preferences about those matters. Experi-
mental psychology underscores the subjective importance of negative
preferences. A wide body of research finds that people place greater value,
importance, and weight on events that have negative, rather than positive
consequences for them. People appear to decide upon their negative prefer-
ences before their affirmative preferences and rely upon those negative
preferences more heavily to reach many types of decisions. Psychologists
have documented a robust "negativity bias," defined as the "propensity to
attend to, learn from, and use negative information far more than positive
information. ' ' 1 The heightened response to negative stimuli occurs at a neu-
ral level,16 appears as early as infancy, 7 and has been described by one set of
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313 (2006) (discussing framing effects in public perceptions of environmental
regulation).
15. Amrisha Vaish et al., Not All Emotions Are Created Equal: The Negativity Bias in So-
cial-Emotional Development, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 383, 383 (2008). See generally Roy F.
Baumeister et al., Bad Is Stronger Than Good, 5 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 323, 362 (2001) (reviewing
the literature).
16. See John T. Cacioppo et al., The Affect System Has Parallel and Integrative Processing
Components: Form Follows Function, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 839 (1999) (finding
larger late-positive potential in response to negative stimuli); William A. Cunningham et al., Implicit
and Explicit Evaluation: fMRI Correlates of Valence, Emotional Intensity, and Control in the Proc-
essing of Attitudes, 16 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1717 (2004) (finding greater fMRI activity in
response to negative stimuli); Tiffany A. Ito et al., Negative Information Weighs More Heavily on the
Brain: The Negativity Bias In Evaluative Categorizations, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 887
(1998) (finding larger event-related brain potentials in response to negative stimuli).
17. See Vaish et al., supra note 15, at 383.
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psychologists as "one of the most basic and far-reaching psychological prin-
ciples.' '
Across a wide range of domains, psychologists find that negative infor-
mation regularly assumes cognitive priority over positive information for
decision making and affective response. When asked to evaluate a target
based on positive, negative, and neutral information, subjects process, use,
and ultimately rely on the negative information more heavily than positive
and neutral information, even when negative information is no greater in
quantity or intensity.' 9 In addition, empirical research finds that people are
not only more affected and influenced by negative information once proc-
essed, but they are more sensitive and attentive to negative information in
the first place. In other words, as a threshold matter, negative information is
more likely to attract people's attention and to be processed. People volun-
tarily elect to spend more time mulling negative information than positive
information 2' and elaborate more extensively on negative information in
terms of counterargument and causal attribution. This tendency to focus
more heavily on avoidance of bad outcomes is arguably adaptive, because
"[s]urvival requires avoiding catastrophes" more than maximizing good out-
23
comes.
Such psychological desire to avoid particular alternatives typically coin-
cides with the ranking of those alternatives as least- or lower-ranked in one's
ordinal preferences, though not always. Disliked alternatives that a voter
actively seeks to avoid are also likely to be ranked low among the available
choices. However, the psychological dislike and low ordinal ranking for a
particular alternative will sometimes diverge to some degree, rather than
perfectly coincide. For instance, a voter may dislike all available alterna-
18. Baumeister et al., supra note 15, at 362.
19. See, e.g., David L. Hamilton & Mark Zanna, Differential Weighting of Favorable and
Unfavorable Attributes in Impressions of Personality, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL RES. IN PERSONALITY 204
(1972); Robert S. Wyer Jr. & Ronald L. Hinkle, Informational Factors Underlying Inferences About
Hypothetical Persons, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 481 (1976).
20. See Christine H. Hansen & Ranald D. Hansen, Finding the Face in the Crowd: An Anger
Superiority Effect, 54 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 917 (1988); Tokihiro Ogawa & Naoto
Suzuki, On the saliency of negative stimuli: Evidence from attentional blink, 46 JAPANESE PSYCHOL.
RES. 20 (2004); Felicia Pratto & Oliver P. John, Automatic Vigilance: The Attention-Grabbing Power
of Negative Social Information, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 380 (1991).
21. See Andrea Abele, Thinking about thinking: Causal, evaluative and finalistic cognitions
about social situations, 15 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 315 (1985); Susan T. Fiske, Attention and Weight
in Person Perception: The Impact of Negative and Extreme Behavior, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 889 (1980); William G. Graziano et al., Attention, Attraction, and Individual Differences
in Reaction to Criticism, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 193 (1980).
22. See Gerd Bohner et al., What triggers causal attributions? The impact of valence and
subjective probability, 18 EUR. J. SoC. PSYCHOL. 335 (1988); Neal J. Roese & James M. Olson,
Counterfactual Thinking: The Intersection of Affect and Function, 29 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
Soc. PSYCHOL. 1, 2 (1997).
23. Paul M. Romer, Preferences, Promises, and the Politics of Entitlement, in INDIVIDUAL
AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHILD CARE, EDUCATION, MEDICAL CARE, AND LONG-TERM CARE IN
AMERICA 195, 224 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1996); see also Richard R. Lau, Two Explanations for
Negativity Effects in Political Behavior, 29 A. J. POL. SCI. 119 (1985) (ascribing adaptive value to
a negativity bias in cognition).
1230 [Vol. 108:1221
Voting as Veto
tives, compared to some hypothetical but unavailable alternative off the
agenda, such that even intensely disliked alternatives may not be ranked low
among the eligible field of wholly unattractive possibilities before the voter.
Conversely, a voter may like all the available alternatives, finding all of
them reasonably attractive, such that even the least preferred alternative in
her ordinal ranking is quite acceptable. When psychological dislike and or-
dinal rank diverge to a significant degree, the case for formally prioritizing
negative preferences in voting may be much weaker. In practice, though,
psychological dislike and low ordinal ranking will frequently coincide, and
as I discuss further in Part I.B, voting procedures designed to avoid
least preferred alternatives may be tailored both in design and application to
appropriate context in ways that effectuate these negative preferences when
they are most intense, certain, or meaningful. In short, consideration of
negative preferences in voting can be adapted under many circumstances to
map negative preferences, when doing so helps recognize people's most
salient concerns, and may do so more effectively than would the exclusive
consideration of affirmative preferences.
Of course, there already exist many voting and decision-making struc-
tures that accommodate negative preferences and enable the more direct
blocking of collective choice. Implicit in the basic democratic requirement
of approval is the capacity for negative action by disapproval. As I discuss in
Section I.B, political scientists have studied how certain voting rules, struc-
tures, and institutions enable various actors to accomplish their goals by
blocking the affirmative choices of others, as opposed to effectuating their
own affirmative preferences.2 4 Instead of identifying voting procedures that
have already been examined individually by political science, this Article
draws out the commonality among these procedures in effectuating negative
preferences, through different mechanisms, and analyzes the tradeoffs in-
herent in doing so. I suggest that such structures, by more directly
effectuating negative preferences, may be particularly useful when they ac-
tually map more closely onto people's clearest or most important
preferences. To the degree that any structure for voting requests only limited
information from voters, as opposed to a complete ordering of available al-
ternatives, voting formally records only a fraction of a voter's full
preference-ordering. Traditionally, voting looks to voters' most preferred,
affirmative preferences. Although it would be silly to argue that negative
preferences always deserve priority over affirmative preferences, it would be
equally silly to argue that affirmative preferences always deserve priority
over negative ones. There is a sensible place for negative preferences in vot-
ing: when collective decision making as a normative matter should consider
24. The negative power to block the affirmative choices of other actors can be leveraged to
coerce accommodation of one's own affirmative preferences. The president's negative authority
through the exercise of the executive veto, for example, forces Congress to account for his affirma-
tive preferences in the formulation of legislation. Similarly, supermajority voting requirements for
passage give leverage to a minority faction that can exercise an effective veto simply by voting
against proposed legislation.
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the avoidance of voters' least-preferred alternatives and effectuation of their
negative preferences.
B. Negative Preferences in Practice: Voting Procedures
A wide variety of voting procedures have developed to meet the need for
recognizing negative preferences. Although the commonality across this
diverse set of institutions has not been explored, voters can express their
negative preferences formally through voting, to varying degrees and
through many different forms of voting procedures. In this Section, I con-
nect a large number of seemingly unrelated voting procedures, used across
many different domains of voting, that differ along important dimensions.
The voting contexts differ in terms of the number of voters, from a single
"voter" in the example of a unilateral veto to a large electorate for the typi-
cal political election. The voting contexts also differ in the type of choice
presented to voters, from the selection of a single choice among a full slate
of alternatives, to a binary choice between approval or disapproval of a sin-
gle alternative. But I lump together a diverse collection of voting procedures
that, despite their differences, offer a variety of formal mechanisms for the
expression of negative preferences through voting. These voting procedures
offer different paths for the use of voting as a form of veto and as an exer-
cise of negative preferences.
1. Voting on Affirmative Selection
Even when the question under voting consideration is a matter of af-
firmative selection, voting procedures may incorporate to greater or lesser
degrees the individual expression of negative preferences. Of course, in such
cases, the election outcome in the end can be expressed most intuitively as
an affirmative one-the electorate's approval of a particular alternative.
However, individual decisions about how to vote on the question may be
motivated by negative preferences, in addition to affirmative preferences,
about the alternatives presented to the voter. Different voting procedures
offer voters different opportunities to express those negative preferences in
the process of affirmative selection.
a. Traditional Plurality Voting
At one extreme, the practice of traditional plurality voting offers little
opportunity to express individual negative preferences as a formal matter.
Voting for elected office in the United States, as the most prominent exam-
ple, is based formally on affirmative preferences-voters record only a
single vote in each race for their most preferred candidate among the eligi-
ble field, with the highest vote recipient winning office. Traditional plurality
voting thus can be inhospitable to the expression of negative preferences,
because it formally recognizes only an affirmative preference for the voter's
most preferred candidate. In other words, "[v]oters have the right to say
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YES to one of the candidates, but not the right to say NO. 25 Traditional plu-
rality voting may enable a candidate with narrow minority support to win if
more popular candidates split the remaining vote. David Duke's second-
place finish in the October 1991 election for Louisiana governor is a classic
26
example. Despite the fact that many Louisiana voters detested Duke's ra-
cial politics, Duke won a third of the popular vote while a multicandidate
27field split the rest of the vote .
As a practical matter, however, traditional plurality voting may allow
voters to act directly on negative preferences when voters are presented with
only a binary choice. When the field produces only two viable candidates-
the typical case in general elections under Duverger's law-the practical
distinction between voting on the basis of affirmative or negative prefer-
ences is erased. In the zero-sum game between exactly two candidates, a
vote subjectively motivated by a negative preference against the Republican
candidate gives rise to the same ultimate vote choice in the ballot booth as a
vote subjectively motivated by an affirmative preference for the Democratic
candidate-both produce a Democratic vote even if the underlying motiva-
tion and substantive preference are different. Voters therefore can act on a
negative preference against one candidate simply by voting for that candi-
date's only opponent. As a result, although American voters are traditionally
asked to register an affirmative vote in elections for public office, voters
routinely vote on the basis of their negative preferences against the incum-
28bent or other eligible candidates.
A simple modification to traditional plurality voting is the runoff system,
which facilitates a binary choice between two candidates and thereby allows
25. Daniel Ferguson & Theodore Lowi, Reforming American Electoral Politics: Let's Take
"No" for an Answer, 34 PS: POL. ScI. & POL. 277, 277 (2001); see also WILLIAM POUNDSTONE,
GAMING THE VOTE: WHY ELECTIONS AREN'T FAIR (AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT) 276 (2008)
(arguing that traditional plurality voting "pays no attention at all to how many people dislike a can-
didate").
26. See generally TYLER BRIDGES, THE RISE OF DAVID DUKE 194-237 (1994) (recounting
Duke's gubernatorial campaign); Douglas D. Rose & Gary Esolen, DuKKKe for Governor, in THE
EMERGENCE OF DAVID DUKE AND THE POLITICS OF RACE 197 (Douglas D. Rose ed., 1992) (same).
A similar, and related, example is Ralph Forbes's candidacy in the 1990 Republican primary for
Lieutenant Governor in Arkansas. Forbes finished first in the first-stage election with 46 percent of
the vote but lost by a landslide with only 14 percent of the vote in the head-to-head runoff election.
Forbes had played leadership roles in the American Nazi Party, Ku Klux Klan, and Christian Iden-
tity movement, in addition to managing Duke's 1988 presidential campaign. See Associated Press,
Arkansas Runoff Offers Foes at Polls who Are Poles Apart, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 12, 1990,
at A5; Clay Hathom, An 'Unbelievable'Runoff." Ex-Nazi faces black in Arkansas GOP race, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, June 11, 1990, at 6D; Robert Marquand, Which Candidates Get to Speak on TV?,
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Oct. 9, 1997, at 1; John Reed, Forbes Softens Racist Rhetoric to Gain
Votes, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Little Rock, Ark.), June 10, 1990, at IA.
27. See generally John C. Kuzenski, David Duke and the Nonpartisan Primary, in DAVID
DUKE AND THE POLITICS OF RACE IN THE SOUTH 3, 22 (John C. Kuzenski, Charles S. Bullock I &
Ronald Keith Gaddie eds., 1995) (explaining how Duke was helped by the fact that the Louisiana
Cajun primary made it difficult for voters to vote "an 'anti-candidate X' strategy").
28. See e.g., Samuel Kemell, Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative
Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President's Party, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
44 (1977); Richard R. Lau, Two Explanations for Negativity Effects in Political Behavior, 29 Am. J.
POL. SCI. 119 (1985); Richard R. Lau, Negativity in Political Perception, 4 POL. BEHAV. 353 (1982).
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direct effectuation of voters' negative preferences. A candidate who receives
majority support in a first-stage election, under traditional plurality voting,
wins office without the necessity of a second-stage "runoff' election. But
when no candidate wins a majority during the first-stage election, runoff
systems require a second-stage runoff between the two highest finishers,
thus presenting a binary choice. As a consequence of Louisiana's runoff
system, for example, Duke faced a runoff election after his second-place
finish in the first-stage election during October 1991. In the November run-
off election between only Duke and Edwin Edwards, African-American
voters turned out in record numbers, motivated mainly by negative prefer-
ences against Duke, and carried Edwards to a landslide victory.2 9 Roughly
the same third of the electorate that supported Duke in the October election
voted for him again in the November runoff, but in the runoff, the rest of the
electorate voted together for Duke's opponent instead of splitting its vote
across several candidates. Roughly 80 percent of African-American voters
turned out in the runoff election and overwhelmingly defeated Duke.3°
Seventy percent of those who voted for Edwards reported that their vote was
"mainly against" Duke.3' Although the runoff election did not commit voters
to vote on the basis of their negative preferences, the simplified binary
choice facilitated the ability of voters to eliminate a heavily disfavored can-
didate like Duke.32
b. Up-or-Down Approval
Voters can directly effectuate negative preferences when they face a bi-
nary choice on individual alternatives that are presented for an up-or-down
vote. Voters are not always asked to select their most favored alternative
29. See Rose & Esolen, supra note 26, at 227-31. It is worth noting that Duke still managed
to win 55 percent of the white vote, including 48 percent of whites who attended college. See D.
Stephen Voss, Beyond Racial Threat: Failure of an Old Hypothesis in the New South, 58 J. POL.
1156, 1157 (1996).
30. See Rose & Esolen, supra note 26, at 227.
31. Id. at 229.
32. The two-stage process of runoff systems might be further adapted to accommodate nega-
tive voting. The familiar form of the runoff system, used extensively in municipal elections and
across the American South, begins with a primary election in which voters vote their affirmative
preference among a large field of eligible candidates for office. See generally CHARLES S. BULLOCK
III & LOCH K. JOHNSON, RUNOFF ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1992). Under certain circum-
stances, however, it may be sensible to adapt this runoff format to negative voting by allowing more
than two candidates to advance into the runoff and applying negative voting for the runoff election.
Similarly, negative voting of a sort can be incorporated into instant runoff voting. Under in-
stant runoff voting, voters rank the entire field of candidates by order of preference, with the
winning candidate receiving a majority of first-place rankings. See generally Robert Richie, Instant
Runoff Voting: What Mexico (and Others) Could Learn, 3 ELECTION L.J. 501, 506-07 (2004) (de-
scribing instant runoff voting). If no candidate receives a majority, then the candidate with the
fewest first-place rankings is eliminated, and votes for the eliminated candidate are reallocated with
reference to the second-place rankings on those ballots. The process of elimination continues until a
candidate emerges with a majority of top-place rankings. However, the process of elimination could
be conducted from the bottom up with reference to last-place rankings. Candidates could be elimi-
nated when they receive the most last-place rankings, instead of the fewest first-place rankings.
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among a multicandidate field. Particularly with respect to substantive policy
decisions, proposals may be presented individually for majority approval in
seriatim. For instance, as a formal matter, legislators vote either yea or nay
on individual legislative matters, and voters in direct democracy vote either
in favor of or against individual ballot measures. Here, the choice is simply
binary-approval or rejection-such that voters can directly effectuate a
negative preference against the particular alternative simply by voting no.
When voting decisions are presented as binary questions of approval or
disapproval, supermajority requirements and unilateral veto rights make it
even easier for voters to block passage. Both supermajority requirements
and unilateral vetoes demand greater consensus for approval by giving
greater voting power to individual voters to block action. Supermajority re-
quirements do so by demanding that greater than a majority of the electorate
vote in favor of passage. They therefore allow a minority of the electorate,
depending on the magnitude of the supermajority requirement, to block ap-
proval even when a bare majority votes in favor of approval. For instance,
the legislative requirement of sixty votes to defeat a filibuster in the United
States Senate effectively permits a minority of forty-one votes to block leg-
islation favored by a safe majority. Supermajority requirements give greater
recognition to the negative preferences of voters against the proposed action
by giving disproportionate weight to their votes.
A right of unilateral veto is a kind of hypermajority requirement that al-
lows a single voter to block approval. A unilateral veto is effectively a
requirement of unanimity because it enables one negative vote to override
the approval of all other voters. It is a descendant of the unilateral veto right
of ancient Roman consuls and tribunes to forbid government action ap-
proved by other actors.3 Most prominently today, the president and state
governors exercise a unilateral veto over legislative action, subject to the
possibility of legislative override, and the permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council possess a veto right over Council resolutions.34
Jurors in criminal trials also exercise a form of veto by virtue of the unanim-
ity requirement for criminal verdicts. A single dissenting juror caneffectively veto a verdict of guilt or innocence and cause a mistrial.
33. See generally David J. Bederman, The Classical Constitution: Roman Republican Ori-
gins of the Habeas Suspension Clause, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 405, 423, 431-34 (2008); Louis
J. Sirico, Jr., The Federalist and the Lessons of Rome, 75 Miss. L.J. 431 (2006). The word "veto"
derives from the Latin term "vetare," which means "to forbid or prohibit." See Roy E. Brownell H,
Comment, The Unnecessary Demise of the Line Item Veto Act: The Clinton Administration's Costly
Failure to Seek Acknowledgment of "National Security Rescission ", 47 Am. U. L. REV. 1273, 1278
n.12 (1998).
34. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3.
35. See Jason D. Reichelt, Standing Alone: Conformity, Coercion, and the Protection of the
Holdout Juror, 40 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 569, 570 (2007) (noting that forty-eight states require
unanimous verdicts for criminal trials).
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c. Alternative Voting Systems
Several alternative voting systems modify traditional plurality voting to
allow greater individual expression of negative preferences. Most of these
alternative voting systems permit greater expression of negative preference
by integrating more detail about voter preferences. The alternative voting
systems discussed here-approval voting, Borda count, preference voting,
and negative voting-are not commonly used but offer means for formally
recognizing negative preferences.
Approval voting asks voters to vote for, and thus approve, as many can-
didates as they wish.36 Approval voting does not limit the voter to a single
expression of affirmative preference and therefore allows voters to express
or withhold approval for multiple candidates.37 More importantly, the voter
also has the concomitant ability to register a negative preference against
unacceptable candidates by withholding approval from them.
Approval voting then aggregates the voters' binary decisions of approval
or disapproval across the entire field of alternatives to select the alternative
with the greatest approval. Other alternative voting systems demand even
more information from voters about their preferences. The Borda count asks
voters to rank-order all available alternatives.38 The Borda count incorpo-
rates this information about voters' ordinal rankings beyond the most
preferred choice and seeks a more sophisticated outcome by requiring a
richer account of voters' affirmative preferences.
Similarly, preference voting systems-instant runoff (for voting to fill a
single opening) and single-transferable voting (for voting to select multiple
openings)-permit voters to register ordinal preferences across the entire
slate of alternatives. When an individual voter's higher ranked alternative
either wins selection or is eliminated in the voting process, the individual
voter's vote is transferred to her next-highest-ranked alternative such that
her vote is not wasted. 9 Voters inarticulately register a kind of negative pref-
erence against candidates by failing to rank them more highly. But they do
so only indirectly, and the demands on voters are greater when voters regis-
ter a full set of ordinal preferences over the field of available alternatives.
36. See generally Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, Approval Voting, 72 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 831 (1978).
37. As a result, formal theory establishes that approval voting advantages centrist candidates.
Gary Cox, Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions, 31 Am. J. POL. Sci. 82, 95-97
(1987); Gary W. Cox, Electoral Equilibrium under Approval Voting, 29 Am. J. POL. ScL. 112, 116-17
(1985). I discuss the centrist tendencies of negative voting further below. See infra Section I.C.
38. Under the Borda count, the rank-orderings for each alternative are summed, and the
winning alternative is that which receives the highest total across the electorate.
39. Preference voting can be modified to give greater deference to negative preferences.
Under the Coombs rule, the candidate with the most votes ranking her in last place is eliminated,
rather than the candidate with the fewest votes ranking her in first place. See Bernard Grofman &
Scott L. Feld, If you like the alternative vote (a.k.a. the instant runoff), then you ought to know about
the Coombs rule, 23 ELECTORAL STUD. 641 (2004).
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Negative voting, by contrast, offers a singular focus on negative prefer-
ences without necessarily increasing the demands on voters.4 The process of
negative voting affirmatively selects a winner out of a larger set of alterna-
tives, but it does so by asking voters to register their negative preference
against their least preferred alternative, rather than recording their affirma-
tive preference for their most preferred alternative. The winning alternative
is the one that receives the fewest negative votes as a least preferred choice.
For instance, American Idol could ask voters to register a negative prefer-
ence for their least favorite contestant, instead of asking voters to vote for
their most favorite. Each week, the show would eliminate the contestant
with the most negative votes as the contestant whom the most voters deemed
the least favorite, instead of eliminating the contestant whom the least voters
deemed their most favorite. Negative voting offers a process of affirmative
selection through reference only to negative preferences and thereby helps
ensure that the most disfavored alternatives will not be chosen, even if there
is no guarantee that the most favored alternative will be chosen.
Negative voting is most familiar for sequential processes of elimination,
where choices for elimination must be made seriatim. For such situations,
when the question posed is which alternative to eliminate (rather than to
select) negative voting taps directly into voters' negative preference about
which alternative should be removed from consideration. Negative voting
need not demand more than the minimum assertion of the most extreme
preference with respect to a single alternative. Negative voting, as a result, is
common for television game shows with similar processes of elimination
based on voting, such as Survivor and The Weakest Link. However, negative
voting is infrequently implemented as a practical matter in political elec-
tions, with the interesting exceptions of Eastern Europe and Russia during
the late 1980s in local elections. In an early wave of Gorbachev-era electoral
reform, voters were permitted to vote on the basis of disapproval against
unacceptable candidates from a multi-candidate ballot.4' Voters did not vote
for their most preferred candidate; instead, they literally scratched out the
names of any disfavored candidates from the face of the ballot.
40. The late George Boehm, a mathematician, apparently presented a voting system that
would give voters the option of a positive vote or negative vote against candidates in an unpublished
mimeograph, written twenty years ago, called "One Fervent Vote Against Wintergreen." POUND-
STONE, supra note 25, at 187. "Negative voting," as I use the term here, describes voting in which
voters can cast only a negative vote, without the option of a positive vote. In the following section, I
describe bipolar voting that resembles Boehm's system more closely. Negative voting should be
distinguished sharply from what has been called negative voting in the corporate context, which is
the exercise of shareholder voting rights by a party who would benefit economically from negative
corporate performance. See, e.g., Jonathan Cohen, Note, Negative Voting: Why It Destroys Share-
holder Value and a Proposal to Prevent It, 45 HAlv. J. ON LEGIs. 237, 237 (2008).
41. See Stephen White, Reforming the Electoral System, J. COMMUNIST STUD., Dec. 1988, at
1; Theodore Shabad, Soviet to Begin Multi-Candidate Election Experiment in June, N.Y. TIMES,
April 15, 1987, at A6.
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2. Voting on Negative Disqualification
A different channel f-t dic cffttuauon of negative preferences is when
the electorate decides a question of negative disqualification. Unlike a ques-
tion of affirmative selection, here the question is whether to disqualify a
particular alternative or candidate from approval, selection, or continuation.
Negative preferences in this context still represent preferences against a par-
ticular alternative. For questions of affirmative selection, as discussed above,
a voter effectuates her negative preferences by voting against disfavored
alternatives and trying to defeat the selection of disfavored alternatives. For
questions of negative disqualification, as discussed below, a voter effectu-
ates her negative preferences by voting in favor of disqualification for her
disfavored alternatives. The framing of the question reverses the necessary
direction of the vote, but the negative preference against the disfavored can-
didate remains the same across both questions.
The ancient Athenian institution of ostracism provides a vivid example
of formal disqualification. Unlike any domestic political practice in the
United States, Athenian ostracism allowed citizens to vote not their first
preference for elected leadership, but rather their negative preference against
particular candidates. Citizens voted by etching on pieces of pottery shards,
or ostraka, and selected fellow citizens who were not to be placed into lead-
ership, but instead barred from leadership. 42 "Winners" of the ostrakophoria
elections were disqualified from holding office and actually exiled, or ostra-
cized, for ten years. Ostracism was intended as a check on tyranny by
deterring or exiling potential tyrants before they aggrandized a dangerous
43level of political power. It simply decided which candidates were nega-
tively disqualified from holding office; the subsequent process to decide
which candidates would be affirmatively chosen for office was conducted
separately and decided by affirmative votes.
Modern examples of negative disqualification against political candi-
dates involve not prospective disqualification in the first instance, as could
occur with ostracism, but retrospective rescission of a previous election.
Familiar institutions such as recall, impeachment, and a vote of no confi-
dence pose the question of removal from office of a candidate who had
previously won election. A recall election allows the general electorate, if
sufficient eligible voters agree to place the question on the ballot, to remove
an elected official before the current term has expired." Impeachment al-
lows the legislature to decide whether to remove an officeholder, usually for
42. The ostracism vote required prior authorization from both the Senate and the public
assembly. See GEORGE GROTE, A HISTORY OF GREECE: FROM THE TIME OF SOLON TO 403 B.C. 94
(J.M. Mitchell & M.O.B. Caspari eds., Routledge 2001) (1907). The Senate judged whether the
polity as a whole demanded the ostrakophoria, rather than determining the merits of the case against
a particular person, and decided whether "the state of the Republic was menacing enough to call for
such an exceptional measure." Id.
43. See Antony E. Raubitschek, The Origin of Ostracism, 55 AM. J. ARCHAEOLOGY 221,
221-26 (1951) (discussing the political origins of Athenian ostracism).
44. See generally THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL (1989) (discussing the history of recall elections in the United States).
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cause. Similarly, a parliamentary vote of no confidence against the govern-
ing coalition represents a negative legislative action to withdraw effective
majority control of the government. Each institution incorporates negative
preferences, not as part of the process of initial selection, but as a second-
stage repeal of the initial selection itself. Voters can act on their negative
preferences by voting for the negative disqualification, in the form of recall,
impeachment, or withdrawal of confidence.
The framing of the voting decision as negative disqualification focuses
squarely on negative preferences and allows voters to remove officials who
previously won affirmative selection despite considerable negative prefer-
ences against them. In 2003, Gray Davis, then-Governor of California, was
recalled from office when only 45 percent of California voters voted against
Davis's recall, short of the 50 percent threshold necessary to defeat it.45 A
similar percentage of the electorate had voted to re-elect Davis the year be-
46fore. However, the 2002 election presented a choice between Davis and his
opponent, Bill Simon, when Davis needed only to surpass Simon's vote total
to win. The recall election posed the voting decision slightly differently, as a
disapproval decision about Davis alone, and thus offered a clearer opportu-
nity to express a negative preference against Davis. The 2002 election,
focused on the electorate's affirmative preferences, featured a scattering of
the anti-Davis vote across several candidates, with more than 10 percent of
all votes going to minor party and independent candidates. By contrast, the
recall election helped voters to pool their dissatisfaction with Davis in a bloc
vote that removed Davis from office.
A vote on negative disqualification need only decide whether to act ne-
gatively, without necessarily deciding on an affirmative replacement for a
recalled official or a displaced majority coalition. In other words, the vote
on negative disqualification is disjoined from a new vote to choose a suc-
ceeding winner. This disjunction can result in what may appear to be
quizzical outcomes. For instance, in Davis's recall, Californians voted first
on whether to recall Davis, and then separately voted for a successor who
would take office only if the recall was authorized. Under California law, a
majority was required for Davis's recall, but only a plurality was needed to
elect Davis's successor.47 It was therefore possible that Davis could have
been replaced by a successor who received less affirmative support than he
did in the recall election. More voters could have unsuccessfully opposed
recall, and therefore voted in favor of Davis's continued service, than voted
for Davis's successor in office. Again, the disjunction between the first vote
on negative disqualification and the second vote on affirmative selection,
45. Vikram David Amar, Adventures in Direct Democracy: The Top Ten Constitutional Les-
sons from the California Recall Experience, 92 CAL. L. REV. 927, 947 (2004). See generally
Elizabeth Garrett, Democracy in the Wake of the California Recall, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 239 (2004)
(discussing the 2003 California recall election).
46. See Amar, supra note 45, at 947-48.
47. See Garrett, supra note 45, at 260 (warning about this possibility under California law).
May 2010] 1239
Michigan Law Review
whereby two elections recognize different types of preferences, can lead to
what appear to be conflicting results.
The actual practice of ostracism in ancient Athens also helps illustrate
this tension. Ostracism barred from office, on the basis of negative prefer-
ences, some of the most popular men in Greece, because it effectively
targeted high-status politicians, generals, and public figures regarded as the
most influential and therefore potentially the most dangerous. During the
fifth century B.C.E., Athens exiled a series of its most successful politicians
and generals, including Themistocles, engineer of the Greek victory in the
great Persian War.48 As a safeguard against ambitious leaders, ostracism
served as a check against unfiltered deference to affirmative preferences
through popular election by disqualifying the very candidates who otherwise
would have won election. Popular election and ostracism, by looking to dif-
ferent types of preferences, complemented each other to ensure that
candidates who were not only popular, but also without significant disap-
proval from other segments of society, were selected for leadership.
In sum, there are many past, existing, and proposed practices, in the
form of both affirmative selection and negative disqualification, that incor-
porate and effectuate negative preferences in voting. Thus far, however,
there has been little scholarly exploration of the commonalities connecting
these very different practices, executed across very different domains, as
processes of recognizing negative preferences. More importantly, there is
virtually no normative literature that systematically attempts to identify the
costs, benefits, and tradeoffs from recognizing negative preferences across
these different practices and across different contexts.
II. VOTING AS VETO: THE COSTS, BENEFITS, AND TRADEOFFS
OF RECOGNIZING NEGATIVE PREFERENCES
This Part begins the project of building a positive and normative account
for what I call voting as veto-avoidance of least preferred alternatives
through the recognition of negative preferences in voting. Voting based on
negative preferences contributes to the avoidance of the electorate's least
48. Lionel Pearson, Party Politics and Free Speech in Democratic Athens, 7 GREECE &
ROME 41, 43-45 (1937). Of course, a system of negative preferences disadvantages candidates with
strong negative preferences against them irrespective of what affirmative preferences they attract.
For instance, Thucydides explains that Hyperbolus was ostracized "not from fear of his influence or
position, but because he was a rascal and a disgrace to the city." THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN
WAR bk. 8, ch. 25 (Richard Crawley trans., Project Gutenberg 2004) available at www.
gutenberg.org/files/7142/7142.txt. But see Charles Fuqua, Possible Implications of the Ostracism of
Hyperbolus, 96 TRANSACTIONS & PROC. OF THE AM. PHILOLOGICAL Ass'N 165, 170-72 (1965).
However, exercise of ostracism against unpopular candidates with virtually no affirmative support
was unnecessary. Universally scorned men, though, presented no threat to be chosen for leadership
by affirmative acclamation in the first place, so there was no need to block their selection by ostra-
cism. For this reason, Plutarch reported that Athenians were "vexed to think that the ordinance of
ostracism had been degraded by its application to so unworthy a man." W. Robert Connor & John J.
Keaney, Theophrastus on the End of Ostracism, 90 AM. J. PHILOLOGY 313, 313 (1969) (quoting 3
PLUTARCH'S LivEs 249 (T.E. Page et al. eds., Bernadotte Perrin trans., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1932)
(1916))). After Hyperbolus's ostracism, the institution fell into disuse for lack of purpose.
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preferred outcomes and invites a reconceptualization of voting as veto that
has gone underappreciated under the dominant focus on affirmative prefer-
ences. I argue not that negative preferences should be privileged above, or
instead of, affirmative preferences as a general matter. Instead, I offer the
more limited contention that negative preferences may be valuable in ways
that have not been fully explored and damaging in other ways that have not
been systematically understood, depending on the circumstances. I begin to
sketch an account of the costs and benefits of their recognition in voting
across various domains where those costs and benefits become more or less
salient.
I start by noting that it may seem counterintuitive, in a process of af-
firmative selection, to give greater leverage to voters' oppositional
preferences, rather than focusing on their affirmative preferences. A main
instrumental purpose of voting is the actual selection of an alternative or
candidate as the culmination of collective decision making. Traditional plu-
rality voting maps easily onto this purpose, because it is based most directly
on voters' affirmative preferences in support of a particular alternative or
candidate. A concern about greater formal recognition of negative prefer-
ences in voting is that negative preferences represent only opposition to
alternatives or candidates. When voting is directed toward the selection of a
winning choice, negative preferences may provide no affirmative answer. An
initial puzzle, as a result, is why processes of collective choice look to nega-
tive preferences at all.
This Part considers the conditions under which greater recognition of
negative preferences may be nonetheless attractive and describes several
normative tradeoffs involved with greater recognition of negative prefer-
ences. As a consequence, this Part sketches what I hope will be not just the
beginning of a positive account of negative preferences, but also a normative
one. The costs and benefits of recognizing negative preferences give at least
a partial positive account for why they are used, or not used, in voting prac-
tices. But just as important, the analysis begins to offer a better
understanding about when it makes more or less sense to recognize negative
preferences in voting as a normative matter. This Part surveys three sets of
considerations-internal, expressive, and instrumental-that present trade-
offs regarding the greater recognition of negative preferences in voting.49
49. A quick, necessary caveat is that the expression of negative preferences usually is em-
bedded institutionally within a multilayered system for collective decision making that gives voice
to different types of preferences at different stages of the process. That is, the choice between recog-
nition of affirmative or negative preferences in voting is rarely a stark binary choice between
recognition of one or the other, but instead more often a measured judgment about the balance be-
tween recognition of one or the other over the construction of a multilayered process. Nonetheless,
this Part begins the project of setting out the important considerations for both types of decisions,
whether it is across or within layers of decision making.
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A. Internal Considerations: Voter Sovereignty and Negative Preferences
A fundamental motivation behind voting procedures is to best track "the
real level of support among the electorate."5° The argument for proportional
and semiproportional representation systems, for instance, is that they en-
able voters to express several degrees of preference and therefore "give[] a
photographic image of public opinion that is as faithful a likeness as possi-
ble."'" To the extent that such an approach carries normative weight, it is
useful to mirror preferences not only in the affirmative direction, but to in-
corporate what can be salient negative preferences as well.
1. Satisficing Incomplete Preferences
As a practical matter, individual preferences are regularly dominated by
indifference or uncertainty such that negative preferences may be the only
preferences worth registering formally. It is simply not the case that we al-
ways know what alternative among all possibilities we most prefer. Just as
Joseph Schumpeter doubted that people "hold a definite and rational opinion
about every individual question,"52 people also do not necessarily have defi-
nite and rational opinions about what they most prefer over a great deal of
choices. People are frequently unengaged, uninterested, and uninformed.
Voters therefore often have not carefully considered and developed a rank-
ordering of all available alternatives. Whatever the reason for uncertainty,
the point is that people do not always know for sure what they affirmatively
want. A traditional assumption of rational choice theory is that people have
well-ordered, complete preferences over all possible alternatives, and that
voting simply effectuates these preferences as they stand; but this assump-
tion often fails in practice. Instead, voters often have incomplete
preferences.
For this reason, demanding voters' affirmative preferences does not al-
ways map most closely voters' subjective motivations in voting. Voters have
in practice only imperfect information about many questions of voting and
may develop their preference-ordering over alternatives only to the degree
50. Richard Briffault, Lani Guinier and the Dilemmas of American Democracy, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 418, 439 (1995) (reviewing LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMEN-
TAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994)).
51. Maurice Duverger, Which Is the Best Electoral System?, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL
SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 31, 34 (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds., 1984); see
also Paul L. McKaskle, Of Wasted Votes and No Influence: An Essay on Voting Systems in the
United States, 35 Hous. L. REV. 1119, 1188 (1998) (noting that "the wider spread of views obtained
is one of the main advantages of proportional representation" such that the representative body
"more accurately mirrors the true views of an even larger part of the electorate").
52. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269 (3d ed. 1950).
53. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy:
Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2144
(1990) ("[T]he assumption of social choice theory that citizens arrive at the process of democratic
decision making with their preferences [is] already well-ordered: the central task of democracy is
merely to aggregate already rationally-ordered individual preferences into a rationally-ordered col-
lective preference.").
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that their imperfect information permits. To develop a more complete order-
ing, they would need to acquire more information and invest additional time
and resources to reach conclusions about the relative attractiveness of the
available alternatives. Given that most questions of voting are not personal
priorities for voters, at least relative to the many other demands in their
lives, it is no surprise that the costs of information are regularly great
enough that voters are rationally ignorant about many voting questions.
With respect to politics, for instance, voter ignorance is "a central part of
political science's intellectual heritage."' 54 The average voter does not judge
learning more about politics and public policy as worth the necessary time
and effort given the many other pressing demands of life.55 This calculation
reflects the costliness of information as well as a measure of complacency
about the status quo. Voting based on negative preferences thus may be use-
ful particularly when there is incomplete ordering of affirmative preferences
and negative preferences happen to be more subjectively certain.
Indeed, there is evidence from psychology that, for many decision-
making contexts, people are happier when they are allowed to "satisfice"
and simply choose an acceptable alternative from a limited set of eligible
choices, rather than being asked to "maximize" and select the most attrac-
tive alternative from a larger set of choices.56 That is, at least for certain
decisions, people may be content not to invest greater thought and resources
into developing articulated preferences beyond a basic negative preference
that permits a simplified satisficing decision. In other words, for some but
not all voting decisions, voting based on negative preferences best respects
voters' calculation about the relative importance of the voting decision and
the costs of developing more complete affirmative preferences.
This economizing approach to voting is more evident for political candi-
date elections on the bottom of the ballot than for those at the top. Although
voters know more about candidates running for national and statewide office,
they regularly know almost nothing about lesser state and local races. When
provided voting heuristics such as party identification, voters rely heavily
•• 57
upon them to decide their vote for these positions. In the absence of heuris-
tics, most prominently for nonpartisan judicial offices, voters may have no
54. Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in Cali-
fornia Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 63, 63 (1994). See generally BRYAN
CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES (2007);
MICHAEL X. DELL! CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND
WHY IT MATrERS (1996).
55. E.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 174 (1999)
(arguing that personal engagement with politics cannot be critically important "unless most people
are to have no life or unless politics is disastrously intrusive").
56. E.g., Jane Beattie et al., Psychological Determinants of Decision Attitude, 7 J. BEHAV.
DECISION MAKING 129 (1994); Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice is Demotivat-
ing: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995 (2000);
Barry Schwartz et al., Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice, 83 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1178 (2002).
57. See David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?:
The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419 (2007).
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meaningful affirmative preferences on which to vote. As a result, voters seem
to approach most of these low-intensity races as effectively a negative deci-
sion about whether to veto the incumbent's re-election only in the exceptional
cases when judges "stray substantially from voters' preferences"58 or err in the
"rare sensational case."5 9 In the absence of such indication, voters simply do
not register a vote for these races or re-elect the incumbent.6
The case of low-intensity retention elections offers insight into certain
conditions when negative preferences may be more certain to voters than
affirmative preferences. First, voters have better information about their
negative preferences in these elections than their affirmative ones. Monitor-
ing of judicial performance is difficult for most citizens, who lack
information about judicial decisions and activity. But they have better in-
formation about certain outrageous conduct by particular judges or certain
extraordinary judicial decisions that attract media coverage. Voters believe
that they have sufficient information to develop clear negative preferences,
which they credit, even if they lack richer information to form affirmative
preferences more generally about the wider field of candidates.
Second, the limited civic significance of these elections, particularly rel-
ative to the top of the ballot, does not require an affirmative public mandate
that exceeds what a satisficing approach to voting can provide. Realistic
expectations regarding the civic importance of these elections, and the need
for a richer experience of democratic engagement and expression, are rea-
sonably low. We do not expect public attention to these elections, nor do
these elections tend to be invested with great aspirational moment. These
elections, in sum, generally do not require the type of collective delibera-
tion, mobilization, and decision that makes normatively inopportune the
formal recognition of incomplete, mainly negative preferences, on the basis
of minimal information. The absence of a thicker affinrnative statement of
democratic direction through the election, as opposed to a simple veto deci-
sion, is not disappointing or costly.
Third, on a related note that I develop later, recognition of negative pref-
erences here makes particular sense if there is institutional value in more
moderate candidates and the exclusion of what voters would see as outlier
candidates. There may be institutional preference for moderate judges who
do not attract the negative attention that provokes an electoral veto. Voters
may be satisfied with elections that eliminate whom they see as outlier can-
didates and encourage judges to remain moderate, uncontroversial actors,
even if voters have uncertain affirmative preferences about what constitutes
an ideal judge.
58. Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 635
(2009).
59. David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 265, 297 (2008).
60. The traditional pattern of high retention rates in judicial elections may be changing with
an increase in campaign spending that is making these races more like elections for nonjudicial
positions. See id. at 300.
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Under a conception of voting as veto, the fact that voters do not develop
nor act on affirmative preferences is therefore not necessarily troubling for
these races. Voters merely go along with the status quo in the absence of any
ready information to veto the status quo. The cost of information is high,
and voters judge the potential payoff as too low. Voters do not consistently
cultivate and base their votes for these down-ballot races on well-developed
affirmative preferences, but instead retain a residual veto power whose lim-
ited decision costs for exercise better matches the voters' desired investment
for those races.
2. Salient Negative Preferences
Even when voters possess both affirmative and negative preferences,
voters may care sufficiently about the effectuation of their negative prefer-
ences to justify formal recognition of negative preferences through voting.
Simply put, for particular questions or sets of questions, voters may have
salient negative preferences that they want formally registered in the voting
process. The usual practice of traditional plurality voting, over a multicandi-
date field, allows voters to express only their affirmative preference without
any outlet to record a negative preference against their least preferred
candidate. But voters may legitimately care as much or more about the
avoidance of their least preferred outcomes than the selection of their most
preferred outcomes. Voting procedures can ensure that voters have the
opportunity to record their negative preferences more directly through vot-
ing, and thus increase the likelihood that their least preferred outcomes do
not occur as an instrumental matter.
The point does not depend on an interpersonal comparison of utility be-
tween an intense minority and an apathetic majority.6 The relevant
comparison is not at all an interpersonal comparison between negative pref-
erences of one group and affirmative preferences of another. Instead, the
electorate as a whole, in voters' intrapersonal comparisons of their negative
and affirmative preferences, may hold most dearly their negative preferences
over their affirmative ones. Voters may have in effect meta-preferences
about which preferences should be secured at the margin, or at least the de-
gree to which negative preferences should be incorporated formally into
voting. Negative preferences may demand more attention when, as a sys-
tem-level judgment about what voters care about, the relevant electorate as a
whole desires to effectuate its preference-ordering from the least preferred
upward, as well as, or rather than, from the most preferred downward.
Under these circumstances, recognition of negative preferences in voting
serves an instrumental interest in giving voice to voters' negative prefer-
ences.
61. See, e.g., Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV.
434, 463-66 (1998) (making such comparison in the context of direct democracy voting); see also
Douglas W. Rae, The Limits of Consensual Decision, 69 Am. POL. SO. REv. 1270, 1274-75 (1975)
(presenting the standard criticism of this approach).
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Salient negative preferences in voting are hardly unfamiliar. What politi-
cal scientists call "anticandidate voting" is familiar in candidate elections
with reference to the voters' underlying motivation for their vote choice-
voting driven by antipathy for a disfavored candidate rather than positive
support for that candidate's opponent.62 To give a prominent example, voters
were asked before the 1980 presidential election whether they decided to
vote for their favored candidate "mainly because you liked him, or because
you didn't like the others?" Only 54 percent said they were motivated main-
ly by an affinmative liking for their candidate, while 46 percent reported that
63they were motivated mainly by their dislike for their candidate's opponent.
In the next presidential election in 1984, 48 percent of those voting for Wal-
ter Mondale reported that their vote was motivated mainly by dislike for
Mondale's opponent, incumbent President Ronald Reagan.64 The binary
choice between Reagan and his Democratic opponent in each election made
it easy for voters to effectuate directly any negative preference against Rea-
gan.
When voting involves selection beyond two alternatives, formal recogni-
tion of negative preferences may be necessary to allow the effectuation of
negative preferences. Traditional plurality voting may enable "the candidate
who, with only narrow minority support, succeeds because more acceptable
candidates split the remaining plurality vote."65 In the 2000 presidential elec-
tion, Green Party candidate Ralph Nader swayed meaningful numbers of
liberal voters and presented voters with a three-candidate race among Nader,
Democrat Al Gore, and Republican George W. Bush.66 Nader, as recounted
elsewhere, split the liberal vote and ensured Bush's victory in the decisive
67state of Florida. Under a traditional system of voting directed toward af-
62. See Lee Sigelman & Michael M. Gant, Anticandidate Voting in the 1984 Presidential
Election, 11 POL. BEHAV. 81, 82 (1989) (describing "anticandidate voting").
63. See Michael M. Gant & Lee Sigelman, Anti-Candidate Voting in Presidential Elections,
18 POLITY 329, 333 (1985). Anticandidate voting is also referred to as "negative voting" in the lit-
erature, see, e.g., Kemell, supra note 28, but I decline to use this phrase in reference to anticandidate
voting and instead use the term "negative voting" to describe a procedure of voting on negative
preferences in Section I.B.
64. Sigelman & Gant, supra note 62, at 85. By contrast, only 15 percent of Reagan voters
reported that their vote was motivated mainly by dislike for Mondale. Id. The 1984 presidential
election thus appeared to be mainly a referendum on Reagan, with Reagan voters motivated by their
approval of Reagan and Mondale voters motivated by their disapproval of Reagan.
65. Steven J. Brams, Run Jesse Jackson, But Under Approval Voting, 16 PS: POL. SC. &
POL. 711, 712 (1983).
66. See, e.g., Christopher Wlezien, On Forecasting the Presidential Vote, 34 PS: POL. SCI. &
POL. 25, 28 (2001) (reporting that 47 percent of Nader voters said they would have voted for Gore
otherwise, and 21 percent said that they would have voted for Bush, with 30 percent saying that they
would have abstained).
67. In a system that prioritizes negative preferences, such as negative voting, Bush would not
have been the winner in Florida or elected president. See generally POUNDSTONE, supra note 25, at
76-91. A less known but more studied example of vote splitting was the 1970 New York Senate
election in which Conservative Party candidate James R. Buckley defeated Republican Charles
Goodell and Democrat Richard Ottinger. See Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, Approval Voting,
72 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 831, 832 (1978); Irving Roshwalb & Leonard Resnicoff, The Impact of En-
dorsements and Published Polls on the 1970 New York Senatorial Election, 35 PUB. OPINION Q. 410
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firmative preferences, Bush won the election even though he appeared to be
the least favored choice for a majority of voters.
The tension between affirmative and negative preferences is exaggerated
further in at least one sense under systems of proportional or senipropor-
tional representation. For elections to representative bodies, such systems
guarantee seats based on a threshold percentage of the vote, assigned across
a multimember jurisdiction. Depending on the applicable threshold of ex-
clusion, candidates and parties with narrow affirmative support can win
seats despite being quite unpopular with many more voters.6 As a relative
matter, proportional and semiproportional representation therefore encour-
age the election of more extreme candidates with broad negative opposition
against them. Absent the usual binary choice of traditional plurality elec-
tions, voters under proportional and semiproportional systems lose the
ability to vote directly against disfavored parties and candidates. A basic
tradeoff, as a result, is that proportional representation provides a more fine-
grained mirror of the electorate's preferences in the affirmative direction,
granting candidates and parties a greater measure of representation for being
most preferred by a smaller segment of voters, but it does so without regard
for voters' negative preferences and thus awards seats to candidates even if
they are deeply unpopular with a majority of the entire electorate.
Formal recognition of negative preferences can enable a majority, or any
voting faction, to express not simply degrees of affirmative preference, but
act on a distinct negative preference against disfavored alternatives among a
large eligible field. Voters motivated by negative preference can strike di-
rectly against their least and lesser preferred alternatives, rather than act
against them only indirectly by favoring one of the competition. Two exam-
ples discussed earlier in the Article illustrate this point-David Duke's
defeat in a 1991 runoff election and the 2003 recall of Gray Davis. Under
Louisiana's nonpartisan primary, African-American and liberal voters could
not vote directly against David Duke, who finished second overall in a mul-
ticandidate field; these voters split their vote across several candidates. But
in the subsequent runoff election, when presented with a binary choice,
those voters buried Duke's prospects by voting against him in an easily co-
ordinated bloc opposition. Similarly, Gray Davis managed to win re-election
as California's governor in 2002 with a winning plurality of the vote against
an uninspiring Republican opponent, with more than 10 percent of the
total vote going to minor candidates. But when presented with a binary
choice just a year later, framed in the negative-whether to recall Davis as
(1971); William C. Stratmann, The Calculus of Rational Choice, 18 PUB. CHOICE 93, 95-105
(1974). Buckley appeared to be the least preferred choice for a majority of voters but still received
39 percent of the vote under plurality voting and won the election. Ottinger was the likely Condorcet
winner, but he and Goodell split the majority vote, leaving Buckley, a Conservative Party candidate
in a liberal New York, to win narrowly based on a minority core of support. Brams & Fishbum,
supra, at 832; Stratmann, supra, at 98-99.
68. See, e.g., Dan S. Felsenthal, Proportional Representation Under Three Voting Proce-
dures: An Israeli Study, 14 POL. BEHAV. 159, 185-87 (1992) (showing that extreme parties and
candidates succeed under proportional representation at least in part because voters do not possess a
capacity for negative voting that voters otherwise would exercise against them).
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governor--California voters with negative preferences against Davis easily
pooled their opposition to him and voted against him.
Recognition of negative preferences not only allows voters to effectu-
ate more directly what may be their most salient voting preference, it also
may thereby broaden the appeal of voting and engage new voters who oth-
erwise would not participate. Recognition of negative preferences provides
outlet to salient negative preferences that are traditionally neglected and thus
invites voters with mainly negative preferences into the process of collective
decision making. Presented with the opportunity to block the election of a
former Ku Klux Klan official as their state's governor, African-American
voters in Louisiana turned out in record numbers to vote against Duke in the
runoff election after weak turnout in the preceding nonpartisan primary.
Gray Davis won a 2002 gubernatorial election marked by low turnout and
little excitement about Davis. However, given the opportunity to disqualify
Davis, many more voters turned out for the 2003 recall election, in an off-
year special election.6 9 In other words, the opportunity to vote negatively
permits voters to reconceptualize what can be accomplished through voting
and changes how potential voters think about their efficacy in ways that may
invest them in greater participation.
The salience of negative preferences within a particular voting context
depends in part on the social-payoff structure presented. The importance of
avoiding the least preferred outcome relative to the importance of selecting
the most preferred outcome is contingent on how much better the most
preferred alternative is relative to close alternatives, and how much worse
the least preferred alternative is relative to close alternatives. Voters should
feel more strongly about their negative preference to avoid the least
preferred outcome when most of the eligible alternatives tend, at least in
their view, to be similar in attractiveness, with only negative outliers to be
avoided.7 °
Returning to the example of retention elections for judges, voters appear
there to care little about picking the best judge and more about avoiding the
worst ones. Although the objective difference between the best judges and
lesser or average judges may be great in terms of aptitude, skill, and judg-
ment, voters may not perceive those differences as particularly meaningful
or valuable to them. By contrast, voters may subjectively care more about
69. Of course, turnout for the 2003 recall election was boosted by the entry of the popular
Arnold Schwarzenegger as a replacement candidate, as well as the publicity surrounding the 135-
candidate field.
70. In other circumstances, it is more important to maximize the likelihood of selecting the
best possible alternative. For instance, fan voting for American Idol may correctly be oriented to-
ward choosing the best contestant on the basis of affirmative preferences. It appears that quality
differences among pop singers, at least as measured by commercial popularity, are largely insignifi-
cant except for the staggering successes of a small number of superstars. E.g., Sherwin Rosen, The
Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. EcON. REv. 845, 846 (1981) (arguing that certain labor markets,
including pop music, contain little diversity in relevant quality, punctuated by a small number of
"superstars" who enjoy disproportionate success). Considering the market dynamics of pop stardom,
American Idol rightly may focus on choosing the single most promising contestant, rather than
satisficing on the basis of negative preferences. Many thanks to John Matsusaka for this insight.
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vetoing bad judges who seem to them measurably worse than the average
judges. Voters reasonably want to focus on effectuation of their negative
preferences when presented with such a payoff structure. Voters are content
to satisfice in terms of outcomes, rather than maximizing for the best possi-
ble outcome, because it secures a higher payoff over the range of cases to
focus on the elimination of the negative outliers.
Voting procedures that permit the selective removal of candidates, such
as recall, impeachment, or ostracism, are tailored to operate only in situa-
tions where a similar social-payoff structure is presented, and negative
preferences therefore are particularly salient. These procedures call for a
vote only when sufficient numbers of voters judge the particular candidate
in question to be an exceptionally unfavorable outlier in the negative direc-
tion. In other words, these procedures operate somewhat outside of everyday
practice but permit a veto vote when a particular candidate emerges who is
sufficiently less preferred than many other candidates. They do not require
the ex ante identification of voting contexts where the social-payoff struc-
ture is typically such that negative preferences will be particularly salient,
but instead they are responsive to the periodic occurrence of social-payoff
structures in which negative preferences turn out to be salient and important
to effectuate. The recall election is not a regular event, but it provides an
occasional outlet for the disqualification and removal of candidates when
certain ones become exceptionally unpopular.
B. Expressive Considerations and the Problem of Ugly Negativity
1. Expressive Considerations
When negative preferences are salient, voters have expressive interests
in articulating those negative preferences more clearly through their voting.
As discussed in Part I, traditional voting tends to obscure the influence of
negative preferences. But if voting is restructured with greater formal focus
on negative preferences, the influence of those negative preferences can be-
come easier to see. When allowed to act more directly on negative
preferences, voters are able to express their negative preferences more
clearly as well.
Voting is an inherently expressive activity. Aside from the instrumental
purpose of selecting an election winner, voting is an opportunity for voters
to express themselves and their views about a concrete question put to col-
lective judgment. The act of voting is a constitutive exercise that
communicates the voters' individual preferences and gives clear expression
to their personal decisions. Although voting may occur anonymously, it
takes on a public dimension of expression when it is not anonymous.7 Vot-
ers announce their decision to their peers and affected constituencies. They
71. Although the secret ballot is nearly universal practice in the United States for political
elections, it is worth noting that much voting is done publicly. To take the most salient example,
legislatures and formal decision-making bodies conduct roll-call votes on the public record.
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take a visible position, with collective consequences, that helps define them
within the community and exposes them for public scrutiny.
Formal recognition of negative preferences allows voters to express
what may be their most meaningful preferences through voting. Voters are
able to act directly and concretely on negative preferences that can be as
equally self-defining and compelling as affirmative preferences. When vot-
ers are motivated by negative preferences, formal recognition of negative
preferences allows voters to communicate more precisely their positions and
judgments. It provides a means for expression of opposition at the moment
of collective decision. Voters can define themselves against disfavored can-
didates, proposals, and outcomes by voting expressly against them. They
define themselves as opponents, not just as supporters of a different alterna-
tive, and they can give voice more clearly to specify their opposition against
particular alternatives in the process of collective decision making."
Formal recognition of negative preferences gives institutional cogni-
zance to negative preferences. By opening formal channels for the voting of
negative preferences, voting procedures acknowledge the influence and re-
levance of negative preferences within a voting context. They recognize and
carve out an institutional space for the expression of negative preferences
that may, depending on the circumstances, imbue negative preferences with
legitimacy as a subjective motivation in relation to the voting question.73
Voters can be motivated by negative preferences not just internally, but they
can act openly on them and have those preferences carry formal effect.
These voters can identify themselves as oppositional-not as subversively
strategic voters who vote insincerely for instrumental purposes, but rather
with the respect of institutional accounting that their negative preferences
• • • 74
are deserving of recognition.
When there is intense minority opposition to the majority's affirmative
preference, recognition of negative preferences through voting can serve the
• 75
functions and values of dissent. It operates within the process of collective
decision making, rather than in ex post opposition to the outcome of collec-
tive decision making. As a result, formal recognition of negative preferences
72. The Supreme Court has recognized at the collective level, for political parties, a negative
right of disassociation. See generally Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regula-
tion, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131 (2005); Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party
Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 750 (2001). The Court generally permits the major parties to exclude
candidates and voters from their candidate nomination process on the grounds that they have a First
Amendment right not to associate with those who share different political beliefs. E.g., Cal. Democ-
ratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000) ("[A] corollary of the right to associate is the right not
to associate.").
73. See CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY 92
(1989) (noting the importance "of the formal properties of political procedures in their expressive or
symbolic function rather than in their consequences for legislation and policy").
74. See DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN
THE UNITED STATES 22-25 (2002) (arguing that elections should offer opportunity to express mi-
nority dissent as a principle of equal respect).
75. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1745, 1749
(2005) (arguing that dissent is valuable for its contribution to the marketplace of ideas, engagement
with self-governance, and facilitation of self-expression).
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in voting gives greater institutional leverage to dissenters. It enables dissent-
ers to influence the likelihood of a collective decision in the first place, by
voting against its approval or selection, and it enables dissenters to air their
opposition in a highly public and salient manner, at the moment of collective
decision when dissent may be most influential.
Finally, formal recognition of negative preferences opens space for the
expression of comprehensive protest in voting that otherwise may be un-
available. For many voters, a negative preference against all available
candidates, the current state of government, or other instantiations of the
status quo, is the meaningful preference to be expressed through voting. The
expressive motivation is neither an affirmative preference for any candidate,
nor a negative preference against any particular candidate, but instead a dif-
ferent form of negative preference--one against all candidates compared to
some ideal currently unavailable to voters. Dissatisfaction with all available
candidates may be expressed only through a "protest" vote for an obviously
nonviable candidate, if there is one.76 Voters who take the time and effort to
actually vote, but then cast a protest vote with no instrumental value, may
effectively signal the depth of their disaffection. American voters typically
do not have the option of explicitly voting against candidates, but Nevada
law requires that every ballot for statewide office provide the option of vot-
ing for "None of these candidates." 7 Ralph Nader, the regular Green Party
presidential nominee, also has long campaigned for a "none of the above"
option for voters.' s
76. A disaffected voter might alternatively attempt to express dissatisfaction by refusing to
vote and abstain entirely, but abstention sends an ambiguous signal at best. Many registered voters
abstain, or simply fail to vote, for all types of reasons unrelated to protest against the available can-
didates. In any event, whether the voter intends a protest vote or angry abstention, communication of
negative preference against candidates can be only indirect under traditional voting because it must
be rendered as a vote (or nonvote) in terms of affirmative preference.
77. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.269 (LexisNexis 2008). The eligible candidate who re-
ceives the most votes still wins office, regardless of the number of votes cast for "None of these
candidates," id., but the Nevada option provides an official method of expressing protest and voting
negatively. The number of votes for "None of these candidates" is typically small but occasionally
nontrivial, including first place finishes in several statewide primary contests. See Robert T. Garrett,
Prop. 23 Backers Tout 'None of the Above': Critics Call the Ballot Measure a Meaningless Gesture,
PRESS ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Feb. 14, 2000, at A1; Clayton Jones, A Choice for Those Who
Can't Decide: No One, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 21, 1980, at 6; Nita Lelyveld, A Push for
'None of the Above'on Ballots: A Calif Initiative Would Give Voters a Way to Voice Disapproval of
Candidates, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 20, 2000, at A3; Brendan Riley, Nevada's 'None of These Can-
didates'Makes Strong Showing, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 9, 2006; see also Ellen Goodman, Op-Ed.,
The Perennial Candidate, BOsTON GLOBE, Sept. 23, 1990, at A7 (noting that "None of These Can-
didates" received more votes than Ted Kennedy during his 1980 presidential primary race in
Nevada).
Other states have considered similar provisions. E.g., Fred Brown, Op-Ed., Who Wants to Be
Second to None?, DENVER POST, Feb. 19, 1997, at B7 (describing a proposal in Colorado); Lely-
veld, supra (describing efforts to enact a similar provision in California through the initiative
process); Voters May Get to Pick 'None of These Candidates', COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 13, 1995,
at 5E (describing proposed legislation in Ohio).
78. See Nader: Protest Vote Is Needed, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 28, 1996, at 25; Phil Rooney,
Nader Criticizes 2-Party System, LINCOLN J. STAR (Lincoln, Neb.), July 17, 2000, at B3; Niki Sulli-
van, If not Him, 'None of the Above', NEws TRIB.(Tacoma, Wash.), May 15, 2008, at Al; David Von
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Ironically, Russian voters had long enjoyed an even more robust option
of voting "Against All" until it was recently ended. Surprisingly, even for
single-candidate elections in the Soviet Union, a consistent 1 percent of vot-
ers registered protest by crossing out the name of the lone candidate on the79
ballot. At least one commentator observed that the Soviet leadership rec-
ognized the value of this limited outlet for dissent and tolerated this low
level of protest voting. A form of this practice carried over to democratic
elections in Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union. The candidate who
received the most votes in a race won office in early Russian elections only
if he or she received more votes than all other voting options on the ballot,
including "Against All."'" A practical problem arose when no candidate re-
ceived more votes than "Against All"-the election yielded no victor, and
legislative seats simply went unfilled.1
2
Such provisions for explicit protest voting open up space for the expres-
sion of negative preferences in a democratically visible fashion. Voters are
able to record their protest publicly through voting, rather than ambiguously
through nonparticipation or abstention. Their protest voting serves both ex-
pressive and informational interests. Unhappy voters satisfy their individual
interests in giving voice to their negative preferences through active partici-
pation. Their protest votes also inform other voters and the candidates about
what may be growing discontents that otherwise might go unnoticed longer,
with less opportunity for remedy, without clear public channels for protest.
Negative preferences matter to voters, have collective consequences, and
thus can be useful to express views for public recognition as part of a
healthy electoral process of accountability and accommodation.
2. Ugly Preferences
Even when negative preferences are salient for voters, it is not necessar-
ily advisable from a normative standpoint to recognize more directly in
voting the "ugly" negative preferences that sometimes motivate voters; these
preferences are socially disruptive, divisive, or otherwise morally question-
Drehle, Nader, the Non-Candidate, Presses His 'None of the Above" Campaign, WASH. POST, Feb.
16, 1992, at A33.
The potential popularity of a "none of the above" option on the ballot is underscored by the at-
tempt by one candidate, ultimately unsuccessful, to appear on the ballot under her new legal name,
"None of the above." See None of the Above v. Hardy, 377 So. 2d 385 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
79. See Jerome M. Gilison, Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One
Percent, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 814 (1968).
80. See Howard R. Swearer, The Functions of Soviet Local Elections, 5 MIDWEST J. POL.
Sci. 129, 143-44 (1961).
81. See generally Derek S. Hutcheson, Disengaged or Disenchanted? The Vote 'Against All'
in Post-Communist Russia, 20 J. COMMUNIST STUD. & TRANSITION POL. 98 (2004) (describing the
"Against All" option and discussing its political consequences); Hans Oversloot et al., Against All:
Exploring the Vote 'Against All' in the Russian Federation's Electoral System, 18 J. COMMUNIST
STUD. & TRANSITION POL. 31 (2002) (same).
82. Hutcheson, supra note 81, at 99-101; see also Ferguson & Lowi, supra note 25, at 278
(acknowledging that allowing voters to vote against all "provides for no sensible procedure in the
unlikely case that 'none of the above' actually wins").
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able. Structuring voting procedures to give greater recognition to negative
preferences also may channel voters toward the greater development and
expression of negative preferences instead of affirmative preferences. In
other words, negative preferences are not entirely exogenous. They may
develop in response to the structure of choices presented to voters.83 An in-
creased focus on the negative, and voters' negative preferences, can be quite
undesirable as a normative matter.
The bare fact that negative preferences are salient therefore does not
cement a normative case for their public recognition in voting. On one hand,
the recognition of ugly negative preferences can be helpful if it is necessary
to smoke them out. When votes are publicly known and based on negative
preferences, voters may abandon their illicit negative preferences as bases
for voting to avoid sanction in ways that may ultimately be healthy. Formal
recognition of negative preferences may therefore force voters to "launder"
their revealed preferences when their preferences are ugly and socially
shameful.f On the other hand, highlighting negative preferences may not
force voters to launder ugly preferences but instead encourage them to
flaunt their preferences and provoke their opponents. Particularly in the con-
text of candidate elections in parts of the United States, recognition of
negative preferences may harmfully underscore deep disagreement and ul-
timately reinforce entrenched patterns of political division, perhaps most
harmfully in the case of racially polarized voting.5 In short, highlighting
negative preferences is hardly a worthwhile goal across the board, across all
domains, and irrespective of the negative preference to be expressed.
Indeed, it may regularly be socially disruptive to encourage a greater fo-
cus on negative preferences by giving them greater recognition. If so, the
way that formal recognition of a particular type of preference highlights
those preferences may reveal why traditional voting, focusing on affirmative
preferences, is so prevalent. Part of the reason that traditional voting seems
ubiquitous is that it is used in most contexts where it would be socially dis-
ruptive to highlight negative preferences. Forms of negative voting require
voters to identify expressly their view about the least attractive option in a
way that may be unduly upsetting among interested parties, or otherwise
cast a negative tone on the voting process. It may explain why American
Idol asks voters to vote for their favorite, rather than vote against their least
favorite. The show hopes to generate affirmative excitement among fans and
encourage individual fan bases for the performers, rather than asking
83. See BEITZ, supra note 73, at 172 (acknowledging that the formation of preferences is at
least partially endogenous); Mark Kelman, Defining the Antidiscrimination Norm to Defend It, 43
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 735, 771 (2006) (arguing that law should refuse recognition of certain negative
preferences to avoid empowering and encouraging socially undesirable tastes).
84. See generally Robert E. Goodin, Laundering preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL
CHOICE THEORY 75, 75-77 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986).
85. See generally Richard Pildes & Richard Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts"
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv.
483 (1993) (identifying expressive harms from the visible recognition of racially polarized voting
through majority-minority districting).
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viewers instead to focus on which performer is the worst on the show. Simi-
lar understandings may undergird the presumptive use of traditional voting
in most decision-making contexts where voting represents a form of evalua-
tion and sends social signals about the worthiness of the eligible
alternatives.
Voting in political elections may be particularly sensitive to ugly nega-
tivity. Political elections are more than means for counting standing
preferences, but a generative, participatory process for fostering collective
affiliation and civic efficacy. Political elections, at their best, ought to in-
spire voters about the choices they have collectively authorized and about
their future prospects. It may be important to encourage voters toward these
affirmative preferences even when voters in fact possess mainly negative
preferences. This affirmative aspiration for political voting is implicit in the
notion of "voting for the lesser evil," because the idea expresses disap-
pointment about settling for the least bad candidate rather than electing a
particularly good one. The voter aspires to vote for what she prefers most, in
an ideal world, not simply to settle for the best of several lousy alternatives,
none of which she necessarily much likes. Indeed, research suggests that the
process of voting itself invests voters with a sense of commitment to the
fairness of the process and greater support for the winning candidates. 6
Elections, in other words, are legitimating institutions that build up public
hope for the incoming winners. To the degree that voting is restructured to
focus voters more squarely on negative preferences, it may come at a painful
cost to these aspirational qualities of elections, such as they are. Voters may
be demobilized by a process more focused on negative preferences, much as
voters often appear discouraged by negative campaign advertising. These
costs to voting as a collective process would be prohibitive under a delibera-
tive or participatory vision of politics, focused more on the civically
generative aspects of voting and less on the individual mapping of prefer-
ences to votes.
Negative campaign advertising in political elections demonstrates both
the potential importance of negative preferences in voting and their potential
distastefulness. Negative advertising builds on the belief that "it is not al-
ways the most liked candidate, but more the least disliked candidate who
wins an election."'" Negative advertising caters to voters' salient negative
preferences by depicting in vivid terms the negative consequences that may
result from electing the opposing candidate. They encourage voters to think
in terms of their negative preferences by channeling attention toward nega-
tive outcomes to be avoided. Consistent with findings in psychology that
86. Richard Nadeau & Andr6 Blais, Accepting the Election Outcome: The Effect of Partici-
pation on Losers'Consent, 23 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 553 (1993).
87. L. Patrick Devlin, Political Commercials in American Presidential Elections, in POLITI-
CAL ADVERTISING IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 186, 197 (Lynda Lee Kaid & Christina Holtz-Bacha
eds., 1995).
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88people place more importance on negative information, viewers find more
salient and pay more attention to advertisements by a candidate that criticize
her opponent than positive advertisements that tout her own achievements. 89
However, negative advertising tends to disillusion many voters as well.
Empirical research finds that negative advertising tends to suppress voter
turnout among independent voters who are not committed to a candidate.90
Negative advertising appears to feed voter cynicism by decreasing confi-
dence in the election process and estimates of political self-efficacy. 9'
Although negative advertising tends to be effective in influencing voters'
choices, negative advertising appears to work almost exclusively by increas-
ing disliking for the opponent and not at all by increasing liking for the
candidate sponsoring the ad.92 If anything, negative advertising may work
despite the fact that it also can increase the viewers' disliking for the spon-
sor as well.93 In other words, negative advertising demonstrates the influence
and salience of negative preferences in politics, but it also suggests the risks
that politics too oriented toward negative preferences may disaffect voters
and may undermine confidence in the process.
3. Weighing Expressive Considerations Within Institutional Context
As a general matter, the very familiar example of candidate elections
may be misleading here as a paradigmatic model. The usual binary choice
between the major parties in many American candidate elections already
offers greater opportunity in the run of cases to vote on the basis of negative
preferences in the form of anticandidate voting. A voter can act directly
against one candidate by voting for her opponent, at least when there are
only two viable candidates. So, the proposition of greater recognition of
negative preferences may bring little added value and instead raise the
88. See, e.g., Shelley E. Taylor & Susan T. Fiske, Salience, Attention, and Attribution: Top of
the Head Phenomena, in 11 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 250 (Leonard Ber-
kowitz ed., 1978); Fiske, supra note 21; Hamilton & Zanna, supra note 19; Pratto & John, supra
note 20; John J. Skowronski & Donal E. Cariston, Negativity and Extremity Biases in Impression
Formation: A Review of Explanations, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 131 (1989).
89. See Paul Freedman & Ken Goldstein, Measuring Media Exposure and the Effects of
Negative Campaign Ads, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1189 (1999); Paul S. Martin, Inside the Black Box of
Negative Campaign Effects: Three Reasons Why Negative Campaigns Mobilize, 25 POL. PSYCHOL.
545 (2004); Michael F Meffert et al., The Effects of Negativity and Motivated Information Process-
ing During a Political Campaign, 56 J. COMM'N 27, 44 (2006).
90. See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: How ATTACK
ADS SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE (1995).
91. See id. at 199-201.
92. See, e.g., Michael Basil et al., Positive and Negative Political Advertising: Effectiveness
of Ads and Perceptions of Candidates, in I TELEVISION AND POLITICAL ADVERTISING 245 (Frank
Biocca ed., 1991); Kim Leslie Fridkin & Patrick J. Kenney, Do Negative Messages Work? The Im-
pact of Negativity on Citizens' Evaluations of Candidates, 32 AM. POL. RES. 570, 580-82 (2004)
(finding that "mudslinging" can reduce citizens' evaluations of the sponsors of such advertisements).
93. See, e.g., Basil et al., supra note 92, at 256-59 (finding negative advertisements "turn
voters off' to both candidates); Fridkin & Kenney, supra note 92, at 583-84; Gina M. Garramone,
Voter Response to Negative Political Ads, 61 JOURNALISM Q. 250 (1984).
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unattractive specter of an exaggerated turn to more negative campaigning
and political cynicism than already predominates. 94 Campaigning, already
too negative in many people's eyes, might become even more negative in
efforts to appeal to voters' negative preferences.
However, today's candidate elections also help identify some potential
benefits of recognizing negative preferences, and offer caution about re-
forms designed to reduce campaign negativity. Advocates of proportional or
semiproportional representation sometimes base claims on an expected re-
duction in negative campaigning, as voters have reduced opportunities to
vote squarely against candidates.95 But voters in plurality systems tend to
learn more from negative campaigning than from positive campaigning,
even if many observers find the negativity unpleasant.96 While negative
campaigning tends to de-mobilize some voters in the center, a growing em-
pirical literature finds that negative campaigning also may energize and
mobilize committed voters to greater participation and engagement.9 7 Voters
are interested in negative information that speaks to their negative prefer-
ences, and they find identity and motivation in oppositional politics. Rather
than pushing for greater recognition of negative preferences in traditional
plurality elections where voters already enjoy a binary choice, the case for
negative preferences helps identify existing conditions of negative cam-
paigning and anticandidate voting as speaking to meaningful preferences
that commonly motivate voters.
Indeed, a greater focus on negative preferences need not be as troubling
outside the familiar context of political candidate elections. For instance,
voting directly on questions of policy generally does not entail the same
types of social disruption and personal animus as voting on candidates for
office. When voting directly decides questions of policy, instead of assessing
candidates for office, it represents a choice on the substantive merits of the
94. See generally ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 90 (criticizing negative advertis-
ing as a cause of voter cynicism in politics); LARRY J. SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY: How ATTACK
JOURNALISM HAS TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS 206-09 (1991) (criticizing the negative tone
of media coverage in politics); Lynda Lee Kaid, Political Advertising: A Summary of Research Find-
ings, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL MARKETING 423 (Bruce I. Newman ed., 1999) (describing
upward trend in negative advertising since 1952).
95. See, e.g., Enid Lakeman, The Case for Proportional Representation, in CHOOSING AN
ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 51, at 41, 48-49. The inability to veto candidates or parties by
voting directly against them under proportional or semiproportional representation can also be seen
as a liability. Proportional and semiproportional representation therefore provide a better mirror of
voters' affirmative preferences for their most preferred outcomes, but without regard to what might
be widely held negative preferences.
96. Kim Fridkin Kahn & Patrick J. Kenney, How Negative Campaigning Enhances Knowl-
edge of Senate Elections, in CROWDED AIRWAVES: CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING IN ELECTIONS 65, 68
(James A. Thurber et al. eds., 2000) (finding that "people's understanding of the electoral campaign
and its political contestants will increase if they are exposed to campaigns featuring a higher propor-
tion of negative commercials than if they are exposed to campaigns with more positive
commercials").
97. See, e.g., Steven E. Finkel & John G. Geer, A Spot Check: Casting Doubt on the Demobi-
lizing Effect of Attack Advertising, 42 AM. J. POL. Sci. 573 (1998); Freedman & Goldstein, supra
note 89; Ken Goldstein & Paul Freedman, Campaign Advertising and Voter Turnout: New Evidence
for a Stimulation Effect, 64 J. POL. 721 (2002).
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policy question, rather than a personal judgment about the suitability and
individual qualities of a particular person. Those choices, even when nega-
tive preferences are the subjective motivation underlying the vote, are less
likely to be taken personally and be socially disruptive. Of course, any vote
may be socially disruptive to a degree, and taken personally as individuals
identify themselves closely with one side, but by comparison to voting on
candidates for office, those risks are less daunting and less likely to counter-
prevail over the possible benefits of greater focus on negative preferences
within a particular context.
There may be greater opportunity for expression of negative preferences
if it is not likely to become socially disruptive, particularly when there is not
a high expectation of social harmony among interested participants. Many
types of organizations do not prioritize social harmony as a primary value,
or they at least balance the interest of social harmony against many other
competing values. Particularly for politically oriented organizations, such as
legislatures or political parties, internal conflict is familiar and expected.
Within such organizations, participants understand that disagreements le-
gitimately exist among colleagues and accept that negative preferences are
legitimately pursued through the process of collective decision making. Al-
though the greater recognition of negative preferences in such settings may
affect morale and intragroup relations, these costs are less significant and
easier to bear when the baseline expectation of social harmony is low. In
short, sensitivity about the expression of negative preferences in voting need
not become socially disruptive or require voters to fixate negatively, but in-
stead simply provides sufficient opportunity for voters to express negative
preferences where they may be particularly salient.
Along the same lines, the costs of social disruption from greater rec-
ognition of negative preferences may be at their minimum in impersonal
contexts, such as corporate shareholder voting. In the context of a publicly
traded company, the shareholders are far flung, have little interpersonal
contact with the company or other shareholders, and prioritize the maxi-
mization of shareholder profit. Encouraging the expression of negative
preferences by shareholders would risk little social disruption in what ap-
pears to be a purely economic context where shareholders should be
expected to demand performance from management. However, shareholder
voting is one area where it is difficult to express negative preferences effec-
tively through voting for board candidates. Given the expense of nominating
a board nominee without the board's assent, the incumbent board's nominee
is usually the only candidate for a board seat.98 Even if every shareholder
vote but one is withheld-that is, not cast for the lone candidate as the only
98. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L.
REV. 675, 688-94 (2007) [hereinafter Bebchuck, Shareholder Franchise] (reviewing obstacles, legal
and practical, to shareholder electoral challenges); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Anti-
takeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 887 (2002)
[hereinafter Bebchuck, Staggered Boards]. See also Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise, supra, at 702
("Under existing default arrangements, shareholders do not have any meaningful power to veto
candidates put forward by the board in an uncontested election.").
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available signal of disapproval-the board's candidate still will be elected. If
shareholder interests in corporate governance are primarily negative prefer-
ences at their heart,99 then shareholders may desire stronger mechanisms for
veto oversight,'0° but without necessarily wishing stronger affirmative rights
of initiation, as some commentators propose.'0 ' Within the corporate setting,
it seems unlikely that social disruption between shareholders and manage-
ment arising from the expression of negative preferences would be a salient
concern, and instead, the stronger expression of affirmative preferences
through rights of initiation might actually be more practically disruptive to
corporate operations.
0 2
Admittedly, certain organizations, such as social clubs, religious groups,
or sports teams, may prioritize social harmony among members, because
these organizations are particularly close-knit, involve a high level of inter-
personal contact, and operate from a normative assumption of unified
interests.' °3 Organizations that prioritize social harmony might forgo the
greater expression of negative preferences to the degree that it would
99. See K.A.D. Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law,
2004 Wis. L. REV. 1425, 1472 (arguing that individual shareholders have inadequate economic
incentive to investigate the optimal corporate actions to be undertaken); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & EcON. 395, 402-03 (1983) (explaining that
the costs of monitoring and even voting are expensive such that shareholders generally prefer over-
sight to control).
100. For instance, a requirement that uncontested candidates receive at least a majority of
shareholder votes cast might ensure that unhappy shareholders are able to veto the election of disfa-
vored candidates. See generally Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise, supra note 98, at 702; Jay
Razzouk, The Momentum, Motive, and Mouse-Kapades of the Majority Vote Movement, I J. Bus.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 391 (2008) (discussing the majority-vote movement in corporate law);
Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 605, 611-12 (2007). In
practice, a majority rule may need to be flexible to different circumstances. For instance, it may be
unduly difficult for a leading candidate to win a majority if the election features a legitimately com-
petitive field of more than two candidates. A three candidate field may split the vote such that a
majority is difficult to gamer, even for a strong candidate. As a result, a lower threshold may be
more fitting, either as a general rule or as a rule under special circumstances of a competitive multi-
candidate field. A number of major companies have adopted instead by bylaw or charter a modified
plurality rule that requires directors to proffer their resignation if they receive less than a majority of
votes.
101. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 895-907 (2005).
102. Oversight through negative veto allows the board to operate on a regular basis without
the interference of the shareholders, who lack the information and operational expertise of the com-
pany's board and management. Oversight through negative veto, in other words, empowers the
board to act on its discretion, as advocates of "director primacy" so value about the American corpo-
rate model, subject only to the possibility of veto in the background. See Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547 (2003);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REv.
1735 (2006). By contrast, advocates of director primacy find troubling affirmative rights of initiation
for shareholders, which allow shareholders to act on their affirmative preferences, squarely because
they permit shareholders to interfere with the board and management's centralized operation of the
company. Unlike the ex post review of a shareholder veto, affirmative rights of initiation might pose
ex ante interference with the management discretion in the best interests of the corporation.
103. See, e.g., Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Organizational Maintenance and the Retention Deci-
sion in Groups, 82 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1129 (1988) (explaining different motivations for group
memberships, including solitary incentives).
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encourage intragroup animus and disruptive conflicts among otherwise
agreeable colleagues. But even for such groups, deference to negative pref-
erences may be important precisely because of the need for social harmony.
Social clubs, for instance, may place particular emphasis on avoiding out-
comes that would upset segments of their membership and therefore defer to
strong negative preferences, particularly if such negative preferences can be
expressed anonymously. In fact, along with their concomitant costs, systems
of "black ball" voting appear relatively common in the processes of mem-
bership admission for private social clubs, such as fraternities, that prize
their exclusiveness and social cohesion.'04
In sum, the institutional context matters a great deal in deciding which
way expressive considerations cut regarding the formal recognition of nega-
tive preferences. Expression of negative preferences through voting may
give voice to self-defining and compelling motivations within the right con-
texts for voting, but it may do so in some of those settings only at great cost
in terms of social disruption and de-mobilization that cuts against recogni-
tion of negative preferences.
C. Instrumental Considerations: Consensus
Centrism and Status Quo Bias
Formal recognition of negative preferences not only maps onto voter
preferences and serves expressive interests, but it also serves the instrumen-
tal purpose of requiring consensus and producing more centrist outcomes.
Prioritization of negative preferences in voting is more likely to avoid a
choice that is intensely opposed by a segment of voters, even if it may pro-
duce a choice that is not most preferred by anyone. If every voter has a right
to veto her least favored (or most disfavored) choice, the field of alternatives
would be stripped bare of everyone's worst-case scenario. As a result, when
negative preferences are prioritized, voting almost by definition weeds out
alternatives that are least favored choices. A choice in favor of consensus
centrism, of course, is not obvious. It is value contingent, and its usefulness
depends heavily on the voting context. In other words, I argue not that cen-
trism is always or even usually the right choice, but when
centrism is a priority, the formal recognition of negative preferences can be
designed to help produce it.
104. See, e.g., La. Debating & Literary Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1496 (5th
Cir. 1995) (describing the black ball exclusion rules for several private associations); Jason Maz-
zone, The Creation of a Constitutional Culture, 40 TULSA L. REV. 671 app. A at 697 (2005)
(appending the constitution of the Washington Benevolent Society of Oneida County from 1812,
which barred membership for a candidate who receives at least five black balls as votes against
admission). Courts actually consider the use of a "blackball system by which individual members
can reject an applicant" as a factor in determining whether an organization is a private club with a
right to exclude. E.g., United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 375 (E.D. La. 1969).
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1. Consensus Centrism
The most robust countermajoritarian form of respecting negative prefer-
ences is a unilateral right of veto. Dennis Mueller demonstrates this centrist
tendency from formal recognition of negative preferences in his exploration
of a "voting by veto" system for committee votes.' °5 He proposes a two-step
procedure by which each committee member first makes a proposal to be
considered and second, once all proposals are announced, each committee
member may veto a proposal under consideration until either a proposal or
the status quo is selected.' 6 In Mueller's example, he postulates a seriatim
vote over the distribution of a monetary sum among the committee. 7 As
voting by veto plays itself out, committee members would exercise their
individual vetoes against the most unequal distributions, such that ultimately
the most egalitarian (i.e., most centrist) distribution would remain at the end
as the selected outcome.'08
But even under collective voting in which a larger electorate casts votes,
the formal recognition of negative preferences favors centrist alternatives
over extreme ones.' °9 Under traditional plurality voting, "candidates care
105. DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 161-64 (1996); Dennis C. Mueller,
Voting by Veto, 10 J. PUB. ECON. 57 (1978); see also GORDON TULLOCK, ON VOTING 163-66 (1998)
(discussing Dennis Mueller's system of voting by veto). The committee in this context can be un-
derstood as a small multimember group in which each member may introduce and vote on
proposals.
106. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 111174-81 (2003).
107. Id. at 176. Mueller predicts that every committee member would propose distributions of
varying unequalness, but always providing slightly more to the proposer than to her committee
colleagues. Id. at 177.
108. In this case, "egalitarian" means most centrist in that it would be the proposal least likely
to draw a veto from any individual committee member. Of course, as Mueller notes, nothing would
prevent a coalition of committee members from colluding for several proposals that discriminate
against a particular targeted member who would be able to veto only one of the several discrimina-
tory proposals. Id. at 179. For instance, two members could offer similar proposals, each of which
gives a third member nothing and splits her share among them; the third member could veto only
one of the two proposals. However, strategic behavior along these lines is not unique to voting by
veto, or voting systems that recognize negative preferences. Similar outcomes are possible in virtu-
ally any voting system, and there is no reason to think that it is more likely to occur when negative
preferences are recognized instead of affirmative ones.
109. The tendency to favor centrist alternatives over extreme ones depends on a critical as-
sumption of rationality that voters' affirmative preferences are single-peaked along a unidimensional
Euclidean policy space. With this assumption in place, candidates with relatively high numbers of
voters who dislike them also tend to be candidates with relatively high numbers of voters who like
them on the other end. Thus, by eliminating candidates with many negative votes, negative voting
eliminates candidates who would attract many affirmative votes as well.
This assumption, though not always appropriate, is safe in a great number of contexts. Political
scientists apply this assumption of rationality successfully in political voting. Keith T. Poole and
Howard Rosenthal show that American congressional voting, as a prominent example, can be accu-
rately analyzed over history as complying confidently with this assumption along a unidimensional
liberal-conservative axis. See, e.g., Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, A Spatial Model for Legis-
lative Roll Call Analysis, 29 AM. J. POL. Sc. 357 (1985); see also Bernard Grofman, Public Choice,
Civil Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of a "Reasonable Choice" Modeler, 71
TEx. L. REv. 1541 (1993) (explaining how much of American politics can be simplified along a
single dimension). Of course, though, there may be settings where this assumption simply cannot be
applied. First, voting preferences may be multi-peaked such that they are intransitive along the
Voting as Veto
only about placing first in any given voter's ranking[,]" but under formal
recognition of negative preferences, "candidates care only about not placing
last in a given voter's ranking."" ° Although formal recognition of negative
preferences does not necessarily induce a dominant strategy among candi-
dates of adopting the median voter's position, political scientist Gary Cox
establishes formally that variants of negative authority tend to favor centrist
outcomes in collective voting."' Just as with voting by veto, formal recogni-
tion of negative preferences in collective voting tends to eliminate extreme
alternatives and result in more moderate outcomes that are less likely to be
most disfavored. By contrast, the traditional practice of plurality voting ap-
pears least likely to induce centrism compared to several alternative voting
methods which allow for the expression of negative preferences, including
negative voting and approval voting. 12
By "centrist," I mean only that an alternative is closer to the median
choice among the arrayed set of alternatives. That is, "centrist" here denotes
only the relative position of a particular alternative compared to the other
alternatives along the relevant dimension of comparison. Centrist in this
sense does not necessarily require that the centrist alternative be moderate or
neutral in an absolute sense. Nonetheless, the median position among viable
alternatives competing for votes is usually indicative of the substance of the
centrist alternative. If nothing else, a centrist alternative is the "most" mod-
erate among the available alternatives, even if not always moderate relative
to any particular observer or other bases for comparison. The continuum
represented by the available alternatives, after all, sets forth the only possi-
ble choices-the extent of the possible-currently under consideration.
Affirmative and negative preferences at the aggregate level are not al-
ways complementary. A candidate, presented to a mass electorate, may be
single dimension. Favoring Bush over Gore and Nader, for instance, may not necessarily imply a
preference for Gore over Nader. Second, voting preferences may be unpredictable along more than a
single dimension. However, the assumption of rationality applies predictably and reliably enough
that rational choice theorists successfully analyze voting behavior in myriad circumstances.
110. Cox, supra note 2, at 92.
111. Id.
112. Cox addresses several alternative voting procedures, including two (negative voting and
approval voting) that I discuss in Section I.B. above. Id. at 99; see also Felsenthal, supra note 68, at
185-87 (finding on the basis of survey data that parties at the ideological extremes fare worse when
voters possess a negative vote, because ideologically extreme voters at both ends of the spectrum
tend to exercise their negative votes against each other, leaving centrist parties in better relative
position).
Grofman and Feld offer similar support for the centrist effect of recognizing negative prefer-
ences. Grofman & Feld, supra note 39. They compare instant runoff voting, or "Alternative Vote" in
their terms, with the Coombs rule. Instant runoff and the Coombs rule both require voters to register
ordinal preferences across candidates. Both methods involve the sequential elimination of candi-
dates, with the votes of eliminated candidates transferred to those respective voters' most preferred
candidate among the ones remaining, until a single candidate possesses a majority. instant runoff
and the Coombs rule differ only in that instant runoff eliminates at each stage the candidate with the
fewest votes ranking her as most preferred, whereas the Coombs rule defers more to negative pref-
erences by eliminating the candidate with the most votes ranking her as the least preferred. Grofman
and Feld find formally, under appropriate assumptions, that the Coombs rule is more likely to select
the Condorcet winner, and indeed always does. Id. at 647-51.
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chosen as both the most-loved and most-hated candidate in a multicandidate
field at the same time. This possibility follows from the fact that, assuming
single-peaked voter preferences that can be mapped along a single dimen-
sion, a strong liking for one extreme also dictates a strong disliking for the
other extreme. For instance, a very conservative candidate will be loved by
conservatives but hated by liberals, while the opposite will be true for a very
liberal candidate. Both liberal and conservative candidates will tend to do
better if the voting process recognizes the affirmative preferences of their
supporters, but do poorly if the process recognizes the negative preferences
of their enemies. They are the favorites of their ideological extremes but
also the most disliked candidates of the other side's extremes. By contrast,
moderate candidates are not hated by liberals or conservatives but also are
not loved by either. Moderate candidates therefore would fare less well
when affirmative preferences are the priority, because they do not arouse a
dedicated base of voters for whom they are a clear top choice. Instead, they
would do best if negative preferences are the priority, because they also do
not represent the most disliked choice for many voters. A process of voting
that tends to exclude least preferred choices pursues a "maxi-min" outcome,
maximizing the value of the worst-case scenario. Of course, under other
circumstances, a blended system that mixes recognition of affirmative and
negative preferences might achieve a better balance of relative risks.
2. Status Quo Bias
For better or worse, a greater focus on negative preferences invites a bias
toward the status quo. Formal recognition of negative preferences produces
centrism by ruling out outlier alternatives that offer deviation from the me-
dian position. The encouragement of centrist outcomes thus almost by
definition tends to reinforce majoritarianism and discourage the selection of
alternatives that deviate from the majoritarian preference. Continuation of
majoritarian control does not necessarily guarantee maintenance of the sta-
tus quo, because the composition and preferences of the regnant majority
fluctuate over time. Nonetheless, compared to traditional plurality voting,
greater formal recognition of negative preferences tends to suppress sudden
changes and reinforce the status quo by giving greater leverage to the con-
trolling majority to block unwanted outcomes.
Runoff election systems, for example, guarantee a majority veto that
blocks the selection of candidates who win with only a minority of support.
Proponents of runoff systems applaud the fact that they "eliminate candi-
dates with what pollsters call "high negatives," that is, a large share of the
public who prefers anyone to this particular candidate.""' By paring the field
down to a binary choice, the runoff allows voters to exercise negative pref-
erences against a disfavored candidate, who might otherwise squeak into
victory by a plurality over a multicandidate field. However, runoff systems
also tend to filter out less mainstream candidates with more extreme view-
113. BULLOCK & JOHNSON, supra note 32, at 31.
1262 [Vol. 108:1221
Voting as Veto
points and less centrist constituencies. As a consequence, runoff systems
were tools of the Jim Crow South and attacked by civil rights activists."
4
Runoff systems made it difficult for racial minorities to elect their candi-
dates of choice, at least under patterns of racially polarized voting, because
the white majority could veto the minority candidate in the runoff election
and ensure the selection of a more "centrist," white candidate. Runoff sys-
tems under these circumstances reinforced the status quo and made the
election of new, progressive candidates more difficult to achieve. They thus
illustrate the costs of the consensus centrism that recognizing negative pref-
erences can exact in the wrong setting.
Supermajority requirements raise the required threshold for approval
and make it easier for voters with negative preferences against a proposal to
block its passage. Supermajority requirements demand that any proposal
garner more than a bare majority for approval and therefore require that a
proposal attract broad consensus. Advocates of supermajority requirements
favor them precisely for this reason. Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky
argue that the supermajority requirement, by threat of filibuster, is needed
for federal judicial appointments because it forces the president to nominate
more centrist candidates for the bench."' John McGinnis and Michael Rap-
poport advocate supermajority requirements for federal spending decisions
for what they see as similar justifications. 6 They argue that supermajority
requirements demand that spending bills must be more public-regarding and
spread benefits more broadly. Of course, the effect of a supermajority re-
quirement is also to make approval more difficult to achieve, because
broader consensus is more difficult to attain than bare majority approval.
Greater opportunities to effectuate negative preferences make affirmative
collective action more difficult as a minority of opponents may be able to
block approval, against a majority in favor, with fewer votes." 7 Indeed, by
contrast to runoff voting, supermajority requirements are one way of effec-
tuating negative preferences to the benefit of the minority, by providing
what amounts to a minority veto. " 8
114. See, e.g., Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585, 595-627 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (finding racial
motivation in the enactment of runoff voting systems to block election of minority candidate of
choice). In 1984, Jesse Jackson argued that "the runoff has devastated the impact of the Voting
Rights Act" and proposed a Democratic Party rule calling on states to abolish runoff elections. BUL-
LOCK & JOHNSON, supra note 32, at 71.
115. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Filibustering Judicial Nominations,
26 CARDOZO L. REv. 331, 342-43 (2005).
116. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional
Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 365, 401-07 (1999); see also John 0. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, Majority and Supermajority Rules: Three Views of the Capitol, 85 T"x. L. REv. 1115
(2007).
117. The minority gains not only the ability to block approval, but obtains a bargaining chip in
the ability to thwart majority approval that can be exchanged for affirmative gains along other di-
mensions. See, e.g., GUINIER, supra note 50, at 16-17; Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings:
The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 173, 246-48 (1989).
118. Others also have proposed outright minority vetoes, at least with respect to a bounded set
of issues of particular concern to a minority. See GuINIER, supra note 50, at 108; see also JOHN C.
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Because greater recognition of negative preferences facilitates the block-
ing of action, it is likely to make it more difficult to effectuate changes
through those avenues of collective decision making. For instance, the num-
ber of "vetogates" in the federal legislative process makes it difficult to
enact federal statutes." 9 The institutional opportunities that members of
Congress possess to block action through one of several vetogates make it
easier to act directly on their negative preferences and kill disfavored pro-
posals throughout the legislative process. As these negative opportunities to
veto proposals increase, collective action is less likely, and therefore con-
tinuation of the status quo is more likely. The attractiveness of increased
opportunities for effectuating negative preferences therefore depends at least
in part on the attractiveness of the status quo.12 Although greater opportuni-
ties to block action make it more likely that any approved action carries
broader support among the electorate and requires the affirmative assent of
more actors, it also increases the costs of collective action and reduces the
likelihood of major changes being approved.
However, by providing the dissenting minority with a bargaining chip to
trade, the facilitation of negative preferences need not always reduce the
quantum of lawmaking to the degree that bargaining is successful. Superma-
jority requirements, to continue a previous example, allow the minority to
block approval, but in practice they may simply force the majority to make
concessions or exchanges that purchase minority assent. Although there are
sensitive concerns on which a minority will not be amenable to concession
or bargaining, supermajority requirements enable the minority to leverage
its negative veto into gains that otherwise might be unobtainable. For in-
stance, in a budget process where the majority party controls the agenda and
amendments are commonly limited, the minority may be able to extract the
addition of new concerns to the agenda by threatening veto, where otherwise
a dissenting minority might have no effective share of agenda setting
121power.
3. Negative Preferences and Entrenched Division
An irony is that greater recognition of negative preferences may make
election discourse more divisive but also make election outcomes more ori-
CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND A DISCOURSE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND Gov-
ERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 25-35 (Richard K. Cralle ed., Charleston, S.C., Steam Power-
Press of Walker and James 1851).
119. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1441, 1444-59 (2008) (presenting a vetogates model of national lawmaking). The Congressional
Review Act grants to Congress a limited veto of agency rule making, subject to presidential assent,
but the veto is rarely exercised. Paul R. Verkuil, The Wait Is Over: Chevron as the Stealth Vermont
Yankee I, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 921, 924-27 (2007); see also Note, The Mysteries of the Con-
gressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2165 (2009).
120. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80
TEx. L. REV. 703, 742 (2002) (describing the benefit of a status quo bias when measured against an
"attractive baseline").
121. Thanks to Daryl Levinson for his thoughts on these issues.
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ented toward consensus at the same time. Greater formal opportunity
through voting to block collective action may focus voters more on opposi-
tional politics and negative preferences. The campaign discourse therefore
tends toward increased negativity and perhaps also divisiveness. However,
the increased opportunities to block ultimate approval not only make it eas-
ier to block collective action, but also make it more likely that any
successful collective action that satisfies those heightened requirements is
more likely to be more centrist, enjoy broader consensus support, and per-
haps in turn reduce social disruption. To the degree that greater recognition
of negative preferences makes election discourse more negative and opposi-
tional, it may come along with the potentially countervailing benefit of
ensuring more consensus-oriented election outcomes.
How best to resolve this tradeoff likely depends, at least in part, on how
deeply entrenched disagreements are within the relevant electorate. Every
electorate contains disagreement that divides it on voting questions, but
electorates vary significantly in terms of the severity and permanence of
their disagreements. If disagreements within a particular electorate are nota-
bly recurrent, entrenched, and well-known, then a greater focus on negative
preferences may be beneficial overall by encouraging consensus outcomes
on what already appears to be a divided electorate predisposed toward op-
positional politics. The benefits of consensus outcomes thus might outweigh
the costs to discourse when the discourse already tilts in the direction of
opposition and division. It is difficult to generalize too broadly across cases,
but the general point is that different electorates benefit from different tra-
deoffs between election discourse and outcomes.
The question may pose its greatest normative challenges with respect to
deeply ingrained group-based disagreements. The greater the opportunity
for veto, and thus acting on potentially group-based negative preferences,
the greater the tendency to encourage group-based opposition. On one hand,
such recognition of negative preferences acknowledges the electoral rele-
vance of those group-based divisions and may help negotiate a lasting
political compromise among those groups. On the other hand, formal recog-
nition of such divisions also may help further entrench what already can be
unhealthy group-based oppositional politics.
"Consociationalism" represents a clear choice in favor of greater formal
recognition of negative preferences when it comes to group-based divi-
sions. "'22 A number of societies characterized by deep, enduring ethnic
cleavages have adopted consociational arrangements that provide for a mutual
veto or "concurrent majority" rule such that each rival group exercises a form
of veto over government policy making."' Consociational arrangements
122. Arend Lijphart defines "consociationalism" as government by coalition of all significant
segments of society, characterized by three basic elements: (1) mutual veto; (2) proportionality for
political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public resources; and (3) a
high degree of autonomy for each segment. See generally AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLU-
RAL SOCIETIES (1977); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (2d ed. 2000)
(describing consociational democracy in Europe and Africa).
123. LIJPHART, supra note 122, at 25.
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predetermine allocations of political power across entrenched sociopolitical
divisions to guarantee consensus rule where the severity of those divisions is
thought to otherwise preclude it. Consociationalism encourages consensus-
oriented outcomes in the sense that a broader consensus across divided
groups is institutionally required for collective action. It yields to the notion
that politics will be recurrently characterized by deep divisions that make
particularly worthwhile the payoff in terms of consensus outcomes more
acceptable across groups.
By contrast, voting rights law in the United States is much more ambiva-
lent about the reification of group-based disagreement. American courts
and commentators are divided about the potential harms of giving formal
recognition to race-based divisions despite what appear to be deeply
entrenched political differences along racial lines. 25 Although American
electoral structures stop well short of consociational arrangements seen in
Europe and Africa, there are commonalities with American voting rights law
in the spirit of predetermined government allocation of power across group-
based divisions. Nonetheless, American ambivalence about even limited
racial guarantees under the Voting Rights Act helps illustrate the possible
concerns about further entrenching group-based divisions through greater
formal recognition of negative preferences. 26 Formal opportunities for
clearer expression of group-based opposition may invite deeper reification
of the underlying divisions that becomes troubling even with the benefit of
more consensus-oriented electoral outcomes.
Formal recognition of negative preferences in voting can help generate
centrist outcomes, but the benefits of centrism are highly contingent and
value-dependent. Recognizing negative preferences therefore can produce
centrist outcomes supported by a broad consensus, but comes with worries
about status quo bias, increased focus on opposition, and reification of en-
trenched disagreement that vary across voting contexts.
III. THE NEW LENS OF NEGATIVE PREFERENCES:
THREE APPLICATIONS
Understanding the importance of negative preferences as a subjective
motivation for voting, as well as the way that different voting structures al-
low for greater or lesser effectuation of negative preferences, helps provide a
124. See, e.g., Guy Uriel-Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First Amend-
ment Right of Association, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1220 (2003) (discussing the Court's constitutional
skepticism about "the state's ability to ascribe a political identity to an individual on the basis of the
individual's group identity").
125. In other work, based on a rich social scientific literature, I argue that race-based dif-
ferences under conditions of racial polarization override other voting considerations such that
race-based guarantees are warranted under the Voting Rights Act. Michael S. Kang, Race and De-
mocratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734 (2008).
126. See Samuel Issacharoff, Constitutionalizing Democracy in Fractured Societies, 82 TEx.
L. REV. 1861, 1864-66 (2004) (comparing parallel concerns about consociationalism and Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)).
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new perspective on familiar questions and existing debates. This Part com-
plicates and adds a new layer to the conventional debates about three forms
of collective choice across varying circumstances.
A. Voir Dire
The voir dire process of jury selection is structured as a negative process
of elimination. Litigants do not have the opportunity to select their most
preferred jurors from the jury venire in determining the petit jury that hears
their case, and instead have only a negative right to challenge their
least preferred jurors. Voir dire is not a conventional context for voting, in
which the votes of several or more voters are aggregated to reach a collec-
tive judgment. Voir dire features only two decision makers, each of whom
exercises a unilateral veto, but nonetheless, voir dire is a process of collec-
tive decision making, the examination of which helps illuminate the costs
and benefits of structuring selection as a process of negative veto. There is
very little positive identification in the literature of the potential value of
structuring voir dire as a process of negative selection, rather than as a proc-
ess of affirmative selection. Instead, there is much scholarly criticism of the
system of peremptory challenges, and there have been several calls for re-
structuring voir dire instead as a more familiar process of affirmative
selection.
127
Understanding negative preferences may help explain the potential value
of the negative structure of voir dire, at least in part because negative prefer-
ences are particularly salient in jury selection. Because criminal law
generally requires a unanimous verdict for guilt, the government should be
more concerned with avoiding a juror who is clearly biased against its re-
spective case than trying to include a juror who is biased toward it. A
requirement of unanimity tilts the burdens against the government because a
single juror in dissent undermines the desired guilty verdict even if the rest
of the jury decides in the government's favor.' 21 Where negative preferences
against a hostile juror are a structural priority for the government, the con-
struction of jury selection as a process of negative selection aids the
effectuation of the government's negative preferences and enables the
government, already handicapped by the burden of unanimity, to act directly
on them. Although the usual imperative in processes of selection is the ful-
fillment of the voters' affirmative preferences over the field of candidates,
127. E.g., Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane, Constructing a Jury That Is Both Impartial
and Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 703 (1998);
Tracey L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to Peremptory Challenge Abuse, 38
STAN. L. REv. 781 (1986); Tanya E. Coke, Note, Lady Justice May Be Blind, But Is She a Soul Sis-
ter? Race-Neutrality and the Ideal of Representative Juries, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 327 (1994); Clem
Turner, Note, What's the Story? An Analysis of Juror Discrimination and a Plea for Affirmative Jury
Selection, 34 AM. CiM. L. Rev. 289 (1996).
128. Of course, as a practical matter, a criminal defendant might strategically seek a mistrial,
when an outright verdict of innocence seems unlikely, depending on the circumstances.
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the institutional requirements of criminal jury trials arguably maps better,
though with its own set of costs, onto a process of negative selection.
The negative structure of voir dire also reinforces the constitutional val-
ue of impartial representativeness. Courts interpret the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of an impartial jury to require that juries be drawn in democrati-
cally representative fashion from a "fair cross section of the community.
' 29
A criminal defendant, however, is not entitled to a particular petit jury that is• 30
itself demographically representative of the larger community. In fact, a
criminal defendant may be barred from exercising peremptory challenges on
the basis of race even if it would make his petit jury more representative of
the community.' Instead, the defendant may object only that the larger
juror pool, the venire from which his jurors were selected, is unrepresenta-
tive of the community. That is, under constitutional law, the venire must be a
representative cross section of the community, but the defendant's petit jury,
the one deciding the defendant's case, need not be.
Without an understanding of negative preferences and processes of
negative selection, the logic of the cross section requirement may be a
puzzle-if community representativeness is important, why require it con-
stitutionally only for the venire, when it does not ensure that the
representativeness of the actual petit jury that hears the defendant's particu-
lar case? 32 Indeed, many commentators argue that the cross section
requirement ought to apply not only to the venire but apply in various forms
to the defendant's petit jury as well. 33 However, for the smaller petit jury of
twelve or fewer jurors, a more robust guarantee of representativeness might
mandate what some view as an unworkable form of proportional representa-
tion for each petit jury. 34
129. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004).
130. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (ruling that the Sixth Amendment does not
require that "petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinc-
tive groups in the population").
131. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (prohibiting under the Sixth Amendment
peremptory challenges based on race by the criminal defendant); see also Holland v. Illinois, 493
U.S. 474, 480 (1990) (noting that the Court has never held that the "initial representativeness [of the
venire] cannot be diminished by allowing both the accused and the State to eliminate persons
thought to be inclined against their interests"); Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1114 (2005) (observing that "Batson [v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)]
prohibits using peremptory challenges to add or subtract jurors so that individual juries reflect the
makeup of the community").
132. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOC-
RACY 129-31 (1994).
133. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Commu-
nity Representation, 52 VAND. L. REv. 353, 366-67 (1999); Deborah L. Forman, What Difference
Does It Make? Gender and Jury Selection, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 75-83 (1992); Nancy J. King
& G. Thomas Munsterman, Stratified juror selection: cross-section by design, 79 JUDICATURE 273,
274-76 (1996).
134. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,86 n.6 (1986) ("Indeed, it would be impossible to
apply a concept of proportional representation to the petit jury in view of the heterogeneous nature
of our society."). What is more, it would require the government to specifically decide on what
constitutes meaningful representativeness and rationalize the affirmative selection of each juror on
the basis of group memberships, Eric Muller concludes that a requirement of cross-sectional repre-
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Given these practical challenges, the negative structure of voir dire takes
advantage of the centrist tendency inherent in selection based formally on
negative preferences. The random selection from the community to populate
the jury pool ensures representativeness in the venire without identifying
what differences are meaningful and without needing to select any individ-
ual on the basis of group membership.135 From there, voir dire expressly
relies on negative preferences in the jury selection process: the defendant
and the State may challenge juror candidates under consideration for their
individual jury, all of whom have been drawn randomly from the juror pool.
Voir dire allows the litigants only to veto the inclusion, and thus exclude, the
other's most favored jurors by exercising peremptory challenges against
them. Voir dire therefore allows the litigants to veto whom they see as the
most extreme jurors, who are the most likely to bias the representativeness
of the petit jury. The central tendency of negative selection reinforces the
representativeness of the petit jury by pushing selection toward the median
of the jury venire, which itself must be a representative cross section of the
community.16 By contrast, if litigants were permitted to select affirmatively
their most preferred jurors from the venire, the selection process might skew
the representativeness of the ultimate petit jury selected. In fact, that would
be each litigant's goal. Each side would try to stack the jury with jurors
holding the most extreme views in its respective favor, 37 potentially leading
to unrepresentative petit juries even when the larger venire is representative
of the community.
As a result of peremptory challenges, a jury is more representative of the
average citizen's centrist view in this sense, but importantly, it is also less
likely to include dissenting jurors who might challenge those conventional
understandings. "9 To the degree that minority viewpoints correlate with
sentativeness for each petit jury as a constitutional matter would be a "vain and impractical hope."
Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error Jury Representation, and the Sixth
Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93,141 (1996).
135. See, e.g., M.I. FINLEY, DEMOCRACY ANCIENT AND MODERN 118 (2d ed. 1985) (referring
to the ancient Athenian history of the jury as a democratic institution and explaining that a large jury
chosen by lot from the population was viewed "as sufficiently representative to count as the demos
itself in action").
136. See Edward P. Schwartz & Warren F. Schwartz, The Challenge of Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 12 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 325 (1996).
137. See Hans Zeisel, Comment, Affirmative Peremptory Juror Selection, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1165 (1987).
138. The new independent Citizens Redistricting Commission in California, approved by
ballot measure during the 2008 election, follows the same logic. The Commission is similarly de-
signed to "ensure fair representation" on a strict, nonpartisan basis and guarantee that redistricting
"cannot be controlled by the party in power." Voters FIRST Act, Cal. A.G. No. 07-0077, § 2(c)-(d)
(adopted by voters Nov. 4, 2008, as Cal. Proposition 11). Once a finalist pool of sixty citizens is
named, legislative leaders of both major parties then have the right to exercise voir dire-type chal-
lenges against individual finalists as part of a complex process of selection. As with voir dire, the
goal of impartiality and a form of centrist representativeness motivates a process of negative selec-
tion.
139. Cf Ethan J. Leib, Supermajoritarianism and the American Criminal Jury, 33 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 141, 167-68, 173 (2006) (noting that in a unanimous verdict system there is a greater
need to use peremptory challenges "to remove bizarre jurors").
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demographic characteristics, voir dire sacrifices descriptive representation
for minorities of all sorts, and with particular sensitivity for racial minori-
ties.'44 In the absence of alternate viewpoints, and with greater reinforcement
of centrist ones, the negative structuring of voir dire is likely to filter out
potentially valuable insights from minority jurors with different perspectives
and different information. By allowing the litigants to act on their negative
preferences about potential jurors, voir dire makes it less likely to include
minority jurors as descriptive representatives of their communities, and less
likely that juries will produce substantive decisions ultimately at. variance
with centrist opinion. Given current levels of residential segregation, voir
dire ensures that many juries contain no members at all of important racial
and other minority groups, which is precisely why so many commentators
advocate restructuring voir dire to address racial underrepresentation.14 ' The
cross-sectional representativeness purchases centrist representativeness at
the price of descriptive representativeness.
Within the context of jury selection, however, the attention to negative
preferences might offer potential benefit: it draws attention to illicit
motivations that are prohibited but otherwise difficult to detect. By formally
recognizing negative preferences, voir dire focuses attention squarely on
expression of negative preferences. The structuring of voir dire as a process
of negative selection forces the litigants to put their cards on the table and
helps expose what are illicit negative preferences based on race. Because
race is a prohibited motivation for challenging a juror for cause, the only
outlet for either the defendant or the government to act on racial motivations
in voir dire is through peremptory challenges. Although a litigant who does
not want African-American jurors on the final jury, for instance, can veto
African-American candidates with peremptory challenges, the direct effec-
tuation of negative preferences in voir dire, through a juror-specific veto,
lays bare the racially discriminatory character of race-based challenges in a
way that affirmative selection of only white jurors might not do as clearly.
Bryan Stevenson and Ruth Friedman, for instance, rely on just such striking
statistical evidence to establish persuasively that southern prosecutors have
exercised their jury strikes in a racially discriminatory manner, even though
courts have often chosen to disregard this evidence in practice.14 2 A dis-
criminatory litigant can justify on a variety of individual grounds a pattern
of affirmative selection of whites more easily than she can justify a consis-
140. See Adams & Lane, supra note 127.
141. See generally Forde-Mazrui, supra note 133, at 353 (discussing the effect of residential
segregation on racial underrepresentation in jury participation and surveying reform proposals).
142. Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of
Racial Bias in Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509, 524 (1994) (using statistical patterns
of race-based exclusions persuasively to demonstrate systematic racial bias). Of course, to the de-
gree that acceptance of racial bias is systematically ingrained, even powerful evidence of consistent
exclusion may be disregarded regardless how clear the pattern. What is worse, blatant disregard can
be understood as tacit approval at least in some cases that cuts against the smoking out of race
where it would provide a venue for such legitimatization. Thanks to Lani Guinier for this insight.
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tent pattern of challenging the few African-American jurors available in the
venire. 143
In short, the structuring of voir dire as a process of negative selection
contains a logic tailored for the institutional purposes of jury selection. It
reinforces the representativeness of the petit jury in certain important re-
spects, with countervailing costs, and the negative structure of voir dire
potentially helps smoke out the use of race as a screening criterion for de-
tection and possible sanction.
B. Racially Polarized Voting
Racially polarized voting occurs under the Voting Rights Act'" when
white and minority voters form separate, opposed voting blocs such that the
white majority consistently defeats the minority's candidate of choice.' 5
Under conditions of racially polarized voting, the Voting Rights Act author-
izes the drawing of safe majority-minority districts within which the
cohesive racial minority will possess voting control and elect their candi-
dates of choice into office over the opposition of white voters. Lani Guinier
criticizes this remedy of safe districts for the racial minority. 146 On grounds
of democratic flexibility and racial nonessentialization, among other consid-
erations, Guinier argues instead for a new approach that discards the
traditional plurality voting within single-member territorial districts.
Guinier advocates the use of cumulative voting as a remedy, on the
theory that cumulative voting better respects the preferences of all voters by
permitting more effective expression of preference intensity.147 Cumulative
voting, coupled with at-large elections, better reflects the intensity of
preference by allowing the "plumping" of votes. 4 Each voter possesses as
many votes as there are seats available at large, and each voter can allocate
more than one vote to any given candidate if the voter feels intensely
143. Indeed, this type of pattern is primary evidence for claims of racial discrimination in voir
dire. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103--04 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (describ-
ing overwhelmingly disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against African-American
jurors). Along similar lines, firing decisions in the employment context account for 60 percent of
successful discrimination cases, while hiring decisions account for merely 6 percent. VINCENT J.
RoSCIGNO, THE FACE OF DISCRIMINATION: How RACE AND GENDER IMPACT WORK AND HOME
LivEs 28 (2007).
144. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973aa-6 (2006).
145. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 56 (1986) (defining racially polarized voting
under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
146. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REP-
RESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994).
147. Id. at 149; Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA.
L. REv. 1413, 1461-65 (1991) (arguing that cumulative voting systems permit "recognition of both
the existence and intensity of minority voter preference").
148. Guinier argues that territorial districting with first-past-the-post plurality voting should
be replaced with cumulative voting conducted at-large to fill all available seats. Voters would there-
fore have as many votes as there are seats to be filled, and cumulative voting would permit a voter to
allocate multiple votes to a single candidate, rather than being limited to one vote per candidate.
GUINIER, supra note 146, at 149-56.
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enough about the candidate. Guinier argues that cumulative voting in at-
large elections better respects all voters' preferences, irrespective of race, by
accounting for intensity of preferences. The happy coincidence, under
Guinier's account, is that cumulative voting properly provides greater
opportunity for minority representation as well, not by virtue of a race-
specific guarantee, but by allowing any minority, including racial ones, to
act on more intense preferences and express those intense preferences
effectively through cumulative voting. Under cumulative voting, "political
transactions would depend not just on the number of supporters and
opponents but on the relative intensity of preferences."'' 49 In the context of
racially polarized voting, Guinier argues that the racial minority, which has
more intense preferences, can concentrate its votes on a single minority
candidate of choice, thereby maximizing the candidate's chances of winning
a seat, despite white opposition.
What is missing from Guinier's account is the vocabulary to describe
voting preferences beyond the affirmative ones counted formally in tradi-
tional voting-namely, negative preferences. Intensity of preference by
itself cannot explain cumulative voting's advantages for minority voters.
There are both affirmative and negative preferences, and under conditions of
racial polarization, it is likely the unfortunate case that the preferences of
polarized white voters against any minority candidate are actually quite in-
tense and can be regularly assumed to be as intense as the affirmative
preferences of minority voters. 150 The twist is that white polarized prefer-
ences are mainly negative ones, less for a white candidate than against the
minority's candidate of choice.' Guinier describes preferences as occurring
only in the affirmative, but not in the negative direction. She may argue in
these terms simply because traditional voting recognizes only affirmative
preferences and, by ignoring negative preferences, renders them not cogni-
149. Guinier, supra note 147, at 1465.
150. See generally Kathleen A. Bratton, The Effect of Legislative Diversity on Agenda Setting:
Evidence from Six State Legislatures, 30 AM. POL. RES. 115 (2002) (finding evidence that an in-
crease in African-American influence produces hostility among whites); Samuel Issacharoff, Groups
and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869 (1995) (describing how, under racially polarized voting,
the cohesive, opposed, and persistent voting patterns of the white majority frustrate minority vot-
ing); Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 291 (1997) (describing white backlash against African-American voting influence in the
South); Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1382 (1995) (reviewing
QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994)) (arguing
that racially polarized white voters are threatened by African-American influence and band together
to frustrate it).
151. Multiple African-American candidates splitting African-American votes is bad in a
system that advances the candidate with the greatest number of affirmative votes-the familiar
case. But in a voting system that formally records negative preferences, the burdens of coordina-
tion would be reversed. African-American interests would be best served by running multiple
candidates. Negative votes against African-American candidates from hostile white voters would
be split across multiple candidates, such that any given candidate would likely have fewer nega-
tive votes and would become more likely to advance. Multiple African-American candidates
would split not the African-American vote in support of them, but instead white votes against
them-a good outcome for African-Americans.
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zable. Negative preferences disappear from the analysis under a default un-
derstanding that is so familiar.
A clear understanding of negative preferences, and how well they are ef-
fectuated under different voting procedures, provides a stronger account of
cumulative voting's potential advantages, particularly in the context of ra-
cially polarized voting. Under single-member district arrangements with
plurality voting, the choice put to a racially polarized electorate is usually a
binary one between the racial minority's candidate of choice, a Democrat,
and the whites' candidate of choice, a Republican. Binary choices, as dis-
cussed above, permit the direct expression of negative preferences and
enable polarized white voters to act immediately on their negative prefer-
ences against the racial minority simply by voting for the Republican. As a
result, the only remedy that enables the racial minority to win elections un-
der single-member district arrangements, which are likely to present voters
with binary choices, is to construct the electorate as a majority-minority
jurisdiction. Although polarized white voters still directly effectuate their
polarized negative preferences, the race-conscious drawing of the district
guarantees that their vote total will be insufficient to defeat the racial minor-
ity's candidate.
At-large cumulative voting makes it much more difficult to effectuate
negative preferences in voting. Voters no longer face binary choices to fill a
single seat. Under at-large cumulative voting, voters must vote to fill multi-
ple seats at once and possess as many votes as there are seats to fill. Given a
multicandidate field with only one minority candidate, minority voters can
easily coordinate their affirmative preferences for the minority candidate
simply by casting votes for their lone candidate. The task for the polarized
white majority is more complicated, because they cannot as simply vote to
veto the minority candidate. They can act on their negative preferences
against the minority candidate only by casting affirmative votes for a differ-
ent candidate. It is this mismatch between the type of preference held by
white voters and the type of preference formally recognized under plurality
voting that helps account for the inability of white voters to block minority
representation under at-large cumulative voting. This insight becomes clear
only with an appreciation of negative preferences and how well they can be
effectuated under different voting procedures.
In fact, it is the absence of a binary choice or an equivalent means of act-
ing on negative preferences, and not necessarily the capacity to express
intensity of affirmative preference under cumulative voting, that is critical to
advantaging the racial minority.1 52 Once the role of negative preferences is
integrated into Guinier's account, what matters most is the majority's ability
to translate negative preferences into an effective veto. For this reason,
152. Even with noncumulative voting, at-large multimember districts complicate the ability of
polarized whites to vote against the racial minority's candidate to the degree that there are more (or
fewer) white candidates than seats available. When the number of white candidates is exactly the
same as the number of seats to fill, polarized white voters can just as effectively vote against the
racial minority's candidate as they could with a binary choice in a single-member district, because
their affirmative votes again are effectively votes against the racial minority's candidate.
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limited voting just as effectively guarantees minority representation as cu-
mulative voting and has been used extensively for those purposes under the
Voting Rights Act,'53 even without any provision for intensity of prefer-
ence.'" Under limited voting, voters possess fewer votes than seats to be
filled, and in contrast to cumulative voting, voters cannot express differ-
ences in intensity of preferences by plumping multiple votes for a single
candidate.'55 Voters can cast only a single vote for any particular candidate.
Nonetheless, minority voters very effectively can guarantee themselves a
degree of proportionality by simply casting their limited votes for a few
favored candidates, while it is difficult for the majority to block their elec-
tion without significantly greater coordination. 6 The key consideration is
that both cumulative voting and limited voting enable the minority to act
directly on an affirmative preference for a candidate, but make it more
complicated for the majority to fill all available seats and block the elec-
tion of the minority's candidate. Even if white voters desire the defeat of
the African-American candidate more intensely than minority voters desire
the candidate's victory, it is not simply intensity of preference that deter-
mines election results. Rather, it is the incongruence of white voters'
preferences to those formally recognized in voting that frustrates the ex-
clusionary aims of polarized whites.
Racially polarized voting also presents a case that illustrates the poten-
tial costs of recognition of negative preferences through binary choices. The
effective ability of polarized white voters to act directly on their negative
preferences against the racial minority is precisely the problem that Guinier
seeks to remedy by proposing voting procedures that make it harder to ef-
fectuate oppositional tastes based on race. The negative preferences of the
153. See Adam J. Cohen, Keeping the Promise: Establishing Nontransferable Election Sys-
tems in Jurisdictions Covered by Section Four of the Voting Rights Act, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655
(1999); Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REv.
77, 163-64 (1985) (describing use of limited vote in the United States); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps
and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 173, 223-31 (1989). Minority voters may be able to achieve similar re-
suits, when permitted, through single-shot voting by casting fewer votes per voter across a multi-
seat race than allocated per voter. Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 1, 6 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984).
154. In fact, as an empirical matter, the use of cumulative voting appears to produce less
descriptive representation for racial minorities than the use of the limited vote, at least in the United
States. See David Brockington et al., Minority Representation under Cumulative and Limited Voting,
60J. POL. 1108, 1120-21 (1998).
155. See generally Leon Weaver, Semi-Proportional and Proportional Representation Systems
in the United States, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 51, at 191. Of course, limited
voting reflects intensity of preference to some greater degree than traditional plurality voting in the
sense that voters under limited voting cast votes for only their most preferred candidates out of what
is frequently a larger field of candidates. But Guinier's argument regarding expression of intensity
of preference is focused on the ability of a voter to express at her discretion a stronger cardinal value
for particular candidates by cumulating multiple votes for a single candidate. Cumulative voting
allows a voter to express not only that a particular candidate is ranked highly as an ordinal matter
but also how much more highly as a cardinal matter than the next most-preferred candidate.
156. An advantage of the limited vote is that it is likely to require less strategic coordination
than cumulative voting for the minority group because the total number of votes per voter is usually
lower. See Brockington et al., supra note 155, at 1112-13.
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polarized white voters are classic ugly preferences that would not be attrac-
tive to highlight or encourage. In fact, Guinier's distaste for the traditional
Voting Rights Act remedy of majority-minority districts is likewise based
squarely on how clearly even such remedial arrangements highlight the need
to counteract the ugly negative preferences of racial opposition. The con-
cerns that motivate Guinier's responses to racially polarized voting are
exactly those which the recognition of negative preferences always may
pose as potential costs. But what has been missing from Guinier's account is
an understanding of those costs within the context of larger tradeoffs pre-
sented by any recognition of negative preferences. Racially polarized voting
presents a case where greater recognition of negative preferences seems
quite normatively unattractive, and in fact suggests a need, and a clearer
direction regarding possible remedies, for even less recognition of negative
preferences in that particular context.
C. Direct Democracy
Direct democracy is commonly praised in theory as more "democratic"
than representative democracy. 5 7 In representative democracy, voters dele-
gate authority to elected officials who offer voters only unenforceable
assurances about their policy positions once in office. In direct democracy,
by contrast, voters may be able to vote for exactly what they most want in
matters of public policy."' Direct democracy thus has been described as "a
way of perfecting democracy," because "[i]t is natural to assume that direct
is better, more nearly perfect, than indirect-that the ideal of consent of the
governed is better achieved by consenting to the laws themselves, rather
than to representative lawmakers.' ' Justice Hugo Black declared that plebi-
scites move "in the direction of letting the people of the State-the voters of
the State--establish their policy, which is as near to a democracy as you can
get."' 6 Likewise, Justice Antonin Scalia agreed that referenda are "the most
157. Of course, in the context of candidate elections, each voter can get only so close to get-
ting exactly what she wants in the sense of ultimate policy outcomes. To the degree that candidate
elections are designed to satisfy the electorate's policy preferences, any single candidate can be only
so ideal because virtually no candidate will match any individual voter's policy preferences on every
issue and every dimension. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 61, at 463-66. Candidates are at best, in this
view, a bundle of policy stances. The voter must be content to vote for the candidate who best
matches her preferences imperfectly, even under the best of circumstances.
158. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1521
(1990).
159. Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative: Procedures That
Do and Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 47, 55 (1995).
160. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (No. 483),
reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONsTITU-
TIONAL LAW, at 668 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975); see also Clark, supra, note
61, at 438 ("If we want to know what the people want, a natural intuition is that we should take a
vote.").
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democratic of procedures."' 6' The operative intuition is that fulfillment of
voters' affirmative preferences is the democratic ideal.
Critics of direct democracy see its practice falling well short of this af-
firmative ideal. A source of criticism is the perception that wealthy interests
dominate lawmaking through direct democracy, particularly the agenda-
setting process by which certain initiatives gain access to the ballot in the
first place. The task of gathering the large number of necessary signatures
just to qualify an initiative for ballot placement regularly requires the expen-
sive use of paid professionals, who charge more than $1 million to qualify
an initiative in California.16 As a result, critics of direct democracy worry
that wealthy interests dominate direct democracy by means of major advan-
tages in the expensive process of deciding which measures reach the agenda
at all through ballot qualification. 163 Another criticism of direct democracy,
related again to agenda setting but distinct from the claim above, is that it
distorts popular input by precluding the expression of priority among differ-
ent issues. By presenting each measure in isolation as a binary decision,
direct democracy does not reflect voters' intensity of preference. 64 Each
voter has the opportunity to register only an affirmative or negative vote,
regardless how strongly the voter feels about the ballot measure. As a result,
Sherman Clark concludes that "[b]y giving the people an 'opportunity' to
consider issues in isolation, we may deny them the ability to tell us what
they most want overall.' 65
161. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 647 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
162. See DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER
OF MONEY 43-89 (2000) (describing the "initiative industry"); Elizabeth Garrett & Elisabeth R.
Gerber, Money in the Initiative and Referendum Process: Evidence of Its Effects and Prospects for
Reform, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING 73, 76 (M. Dane Waters ed., 2001); Arthur
Lupia & John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old Questions, 7 ANN. REV.
POL. ScI. 463, 471 (2004) (noting that paid signature collectors charge more than $1 million to
qualify an initiative in California and "are becoming nearly indispensable in many states").
163. BRODER, supra note 162, at 243 ("[T]he experience with the initiative process at the state
level in the last two decades is that wealthy individuals and special interests ... have learned all too
well how to subvert the process to their own purposes."); see also Nicole Bremner Cdsarez, Corrup-
tion, Corrosion, and Corporate Political Speech, 70 NEB. L. REV. 689 (1991); Jamin B. Raskin,
Direct Democracy, Corporate Power and Judicial Review of Popularly-enacted Campaign Finance
Reform, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 393; John S. Shockley, Direct Democracy Campaign Finance,
and the Courts: Can Corruption, Undue Influence, and Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 39
U. MIAMI L. REV. 377 (1985).
164. But see Lynn A. Baker, Preferences, Priorities, and Plebiscites, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 317, 323-24 (2004) (arguing that direct democracy offers opportunity to express intensity of
preference through voter turnout); Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective
Action in Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930 (1988); Eli M. Noam, The Efficiency of
Direct Democracy, 88 J. POL. ECON. 803 (1980) (arguing that inefficient outcomes are infrequent in
direct democracy, even. accounting for intensity of preference). See generally Clark, supra note 61
(arguing that initiatives and referenda cannot accurately or reliably reflect the popular will of vot-
ers).
165. Clark, supra note 61, at 467; see also Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social
Choice, Crypto-Initiatives, and Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 963-66
(2005) (criticizing direct democracy as a process of serial elimination that denies voters the ability
to make tradeoffs and compare all available alternatives).
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Underlying these criticisms is the assumption that direct democracy
ought to pursue the realization of the public's affirmative preferences. The
agenda-setting process in direct democracy troubles critics because it does
not necessarily advance the public's most favored policies for direct democ-
ratic action. Clark, for instance, contends that in direct democracy "the goal
is to hear the voice of the people as well and as fully as possible."' 66 His cri-
tique thus is that "[i]f we want to listen to the people, we ought to try and let
them speak as clearly as possible."'' 67 Similarly, critics of direct democracy
concerned about the disproportionate influence of wealthy interests likewise
predicate their indictment of direct democracy on its divergence from the
public's affirmative preferences. The set of measures that win ballot place-
ment is biased and does not reflect the public's priorities about what it most
wants implemented as public policy.
In fact, public choice theory suggests little hope that direct democracy,
however configured, can identify and fulfill the public's most preferred poli-
cies. Voting paradoxes render elusive the identification of the mass public's
most preferred policy even within a single policy domain, let alone identifi-
cation of priorities across policy domains.' 68 Preference cycles, strategic
voting, and the bias of agenda setting plague these determinations though
the procedures of voting. As a consequence, voting in direct democracy may
embody, at best, a "negative ideal" without any assurance, perhaps without
much possibility, of producing "a clear, consistent, meaningful statement of
the popular will.' ' 169 Critics of direct democracy may be right that direct de-
mocracy fails to fulfill the public's affirmative preferences, in the sense of
consistently producing its most preferred, ideal policies, but the standard for
success may be wrongly directed toward the ambition of affirmative ideals,
instead of the protective posture of vetoing harm. 70
Regardless how poorly direct democracy performs with respect to the
public's affirmative preferences, direct democracy serves reasonably well in
defending the public's negative preferences. The binary choice in direct de-
mocracy with respect to each ballot measure enables voters to vote "no" and
effectively reject any measure that it disfavors. This is exactly what voters
166. Clark, supra note 61, at 448.
167. Id. at 450.
168. See generally RIKER, supra note 11.
169. RIKER, supra note 11, at 242. Riker also observes that "there has been considerable disil-
lusionment with referenda" flowing from the mistaken progressive-era belief that they "provide a
'truer' expression of the popular will," when, in fact, referenda have "produced both inconsistent
and bizarre legislation." Id. at 251.
170. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES IN L. 87, 122 (2002) ("In short, the plebiscites we know do have many flaws, but a kind
of incrementalist argument in their favor."). In practice, of course, voting in direct democracy may
be more complicated. Voters might be confused or misled into voting contrary to their actual prefer-
ences, making fundamental voting errors. The bias in ballot access may be so exaggerated that a
reasonable number of voting errors on so many unattractive ballot measures ultimately yields en-
actment of unpopular ballot measures. However, the available data finds that direct democracy, as
expected in theory, does not move policy away from median preferences. See infra notes 179-180.
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routinely dt": political scientists and economists find that voters regularly
reject ballot measures as a default response when they are unsure about how
they feel and how to vote on a ballot measure. 72 Although voters approve
routine measures that do not raise uncertainty, 7 1 voters frequently reject
nonroutine measures even when sponsored by wealthy interests that fund
heavy campaigning in their support. 1 4 Campaign spending appears to exac-
erbate the voters' default response of rejecting nonroutine ballot measures,
thus helping to defeat them, but is less effective at helping them ultimately
win.17
The voters' default response of "no" reflects a healthy distrust about an
offered ballot measure that places the burden of persuasion on its propo-
nents. Voters need not invest heavily in learning about ballot measures,
secure in the knowledge that direct democracy may not fulfill their most
ideal wishes, but that they will effectively enforce their simple negative pre-
ferences. 76 With this adaptive orientation toward direct democracy as a mere
supplement to the regular legislative process, 7 7 voters need not be knowl-
edgeable about public policy, and direct democracy is economically
responsive to the negative preferences that voters possess and not to an aspi-
ration of affirmative preferences that they do not.
171. See Elisabeth R. Gerber, Pressuring Legislatures through the Use of Initiatives: Two
Forms of Indirect Influence, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES 191, 191 (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 1998) (explaining that only 42 percent of statewide
initiatives from 1981 and 1990 passed and success rate was less than 30 percent before the late
1970s).
172. See SHAUN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPINION, VOTING, AND
DIRECT DEMOCRACY 43-66 (1998) (showing that voters resort to a default rejection of ballot meas-
ures under uncertainty); DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 142 (1984) (arguing that voters vote "no" when confused by
ballot measures).
173. See Richard L. Hasen, Assessing California's Hybrid Democracy, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1501
(2009) (reviewing MARK BALDASSARE & CHERYL KATZ, THE COMING AGE OF DIRECT DEMOC-
RACY: CALIFORNIA'S RECALL AND BEYOND (2007)) (reporting that voters tend overwhelmingly to
approve legislative ballot measures, most of which are routine bond measures, but tend to reject
citizen-proposed initiatives).
174. See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 172, at 148 (reporting that ballot measures won approval
less than half the time when supporters spent two-thirds more than the opposition); Daniel H. Lo-
wenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory
and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505, 518-19 (1982) (reporting that nine of ten proposi-
tions over twelve years that were opposed by large spending advantages were defeated, while seven
of fifteen supported by large spending were approved).
175. See ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND
THE PROMISE OF DIECT LEGISLATION (1999); Susan A. Banducci, Direct Legislation: When Is It
Used and When Does It Pass?, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra note 171, at 109, 127.
176. See Levmore, supra note 170, at 122 (concluding with respect to plebiscites that "[ilf the
task is not to find a Condoreet winner and not to find the correct answer, but to see whether a given
option, X, is better than the status quo, S, then this familiar form of decisionmaking is not bad").
177. See Baker, supra note 164, at 318 (describing direct democracy as a beneficial supple-
ment to representative democracy); Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1096 (2005) (characterizing use of direct democracy as part of hybrid democracy that mixes to-
gether direct and representative democracy); Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEx. L.
REV. 1347, 1350 (1985) (reviewing MAGLEBY, supra note 172) (explaining that direct democracy,
where it is used, interacts and co-exists with representative democracy).
Voting as Veto
In practice, as a result, direct democracy in the end actually produces an
incremental majoritarian improvement over the status quo in terms of pol-
icy. 7 The set of ballot measures presented for public vote in direct
democracy may be skewed by wealthy interests in ballot qualification, but
the voters' default rejection of ballot measures appears to correct for this
bias. A wealth of empirical research shows that direct democracy generally
•179
tends to bring public policy roughly closer to the median voter. The reason
is simple-whatever the set of ballot measures that gains ballot qualifica-
tion, no matter how one-sided the menu presented on the ballot for a vote,
only those measures that improve upon the status quo in the majority's eyes
will win approval.'8° Again, this finding does not imply that direct democ-
racy realizes the electorate's most preferred policies, whatever they are, nor
does it imply any gains will be large or impressive. Nonetheless, subject to
more modest, perhaps more appropriate expectations, direct democracy
leaves the electorate no worse off and offers a chance to be better off.
The public's adaptive response to the realities of direct democracy might
explain public opinion about direct democracy. For instance, in California,
where direct democracy is used most, almost half of survey respondents be-
lieve that ballot measure elections come out the way "a few organized special
interests want'" compared to only a third of respondents who believe that they
come out "the way most people want."'8 ' In addition, 52 percent of Califor-
nians believe the initiative process was controlled "a lot" by special interests,
while another 44 percent believe it was controlled "somewhat" by special in-
terests. 82 Despite these beliefs, roughly three out of four Californians approve
178. My claim, however, is not necessarily that the policy results from direct democracy are
objectively optimal in any other sense than that they accord with the general preferences of the
majority. Many critics of direct democracy argue that it results in objectively bad policy and dis-
criminates against minority groups. See, e.g., BRODER, supra note 162; Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The
Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978); Kevin R. John-
son, A Handicapped, Not "'Sleeping," Giant: The Devastating Impact of the Initiative Process on
Latina/o and Immigrant Communities, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (2008); Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct
Democracy Be Made Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 903 (2006); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative
Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L.
REV. 19 (1993).
179. See JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, PUBLIC POL-
ICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 140-41 (2004); see also GERBER, supra note 175, at 126-36
(finding that parental abortion notification and death penalty law is more responsive to majoritarian
preferences in states where the initiative is available); Michael S. Kang, Counting on Initiatives?:
An Empirical Assessment, 4 ELECTION L.J. 217 (2005) (reviewing MATSUSAKA, supra; and DANIEL
A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE: THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT DEMOC-
RACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERICAN STATES (2004)). But see
Edward L. Lascher, Jr., et al., Gun Behind the Door? Ballot Initiatives, State Policies and Public
Opinion, 58 J. POL. 760 (1996) (contending that initiative states do not produce more responsive
policy).
180. See MATSUSAKA, supra note 179, at 12 ("[T]he fact that narrow interests dominate the
initiative process... does not necessarily imply that the final outcomes are nonmajoritarian.").
181. Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and Expenditure
Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 911 (2005) (reporting the results of a
2004 Field Research Corporation survey).
182. Id. (reporting the results of a 2001 Public Policy Institute of Califomia survey).
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of direct democracy in the state, 83 and 68 percent of the public reports that it
is "very satisfied" or at least "somewhat satisfied" with the initiative process
in the state.' 84 About three out of four also think it is a "good thing.., that a
majority of voters can make laws and change public policies by passing ini-
tiatives."" 5 These seemingly dissonant beliefs may reflect ambivalence
about the observable influence of special interests on one hand, particularly
in ballot qualification, but also reflect on the other hand the public's confi-
dence about exercising its voting veto.
CONCLUSION
This Article attempts to develop the notion of negative preferences,
discuss how and when voting based on negative preferences may be ad-
vantageous, and then describe how negative preferences already influence
different forms of voting in ways that have been easy to overlook. Two
alternative conceptions-the traditional focus on affirmative preferences
and a reconceptualization of voting as veto-offer relative advantages and
disadvantages that suit different contexts for voting. Failure to achieve vot-
ers' most preferred outcomes through elections is routinely viewed as a
failure of the democratic process, but the alternative aim of avoiding least
preferred outcomes has gone underappreciated. This Article identifies the
relevant tradeoffs from recognizing negative preferences to a greater degree
and describes cases where voting has evolved usefully to accommodate
negative preferences, as well as cases where formal recognition of negative
preferences is or would be less advantageous.
The development of a system for collective choice involves multiple
layers of decision making. This Article thus is stylized in the sense that
agenda setting is necessary before any vote, and almost all collective deci-
sion making occurs within a layered institutional context with numerous
decision points. Collective decision making requires a multistage process in
which formal recognition of affirmative and negative preferences can be
blended together over the process as a whole, rather than looking exclu-
sively to affirmative or negative preferences as all-or-nothing choices. It is
still useful for any given stage to determine whether voting strikes the right
balance for recognition of negative preferences, but in addition, it is impor-
tant to consider the formal recognition of negative preferences in relation to
the process as a whole. In other words, the tailoring of voting to circum-
stance occurs not only within any individual stage of voting, but also as a
matter of striking a balance of affirmative and negative preference across
component stages of voting and decision.
183. See MARK BALDASSARE & CHERYL KATZ, THE COMING AGE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY:
CALIFORNIA'S RECALL AND BEYOND 31 (2008) (reporting an August 2006 survey finding that 72
percent of Californians were satisfied with the way the initiative process is working in California).
184. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, SPECIAL SURVEY ON CALIFORNIANS AND
THE INITIATIVE PROCESS 25 (Aug. 2005).
185. BALDASSARE & KATZ, supra note 183, at 23.
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What is more, this Article focuses on the incorporation of negative pref-
erences in the process of collective decision making, rather than through a
negative liberty not to participate or be bound by the outcomes of collective
decision making. A different means of honoring negative preferences is the
granting of a right to opt OUt. 86 Autonomy from both the process of decision
making and the effects of the ultimate decision allows dissenters the ability
not to be affected by the decision and therefore respects their negative pref-
erences against particular outcomes. The Article, however, focuses on
inclusion and incorporation of negative preferences, instead of the isolation
and exclusion of those with negative preferences. Further work on negative
preferences will need to explore their operation beyond voting as well.
186. For instance, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give class members the opportunity to
"opt out" of a class action settlement, in addition to and separate from the opportunity to object
formally to the fairness of a proposed class action settlement. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey
Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical
Issues, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1529 (2004). Thanks to Bill Rubenstein on this point.
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